Nationalism Constructed Against “Others”: Chiapas’s Anti-Chinese Movement And State Formation In Postrevolutionary Mexico by NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University & Wu, Yuxiu
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONALISM CONSTRUCTED AGAINST “OTHERS”: CHIAPAS’S ANTI- 
CHINESE MOVEMENT AND STATE FORMATION IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY 
MEXICO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
by 
YUXIU WU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School 
 at Appalachian State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2016 
Department of History 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
NATIONALISM CONSTRUCTED AGAINST “OTHERS”: CHIAPAS’S ANTI- 
CHINESE MOVEMENT AND STATE FORMATION IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY 
MEXICO 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
by 
YUXIU WU 
August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY:  
  
 
        
Jeffery L. Bortz, Ph.D. 
Chairperson, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Benno R. Weiner, Ph.D. 
Member, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
W. Scott Jessee, Ph.D. 
Member, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
James R. Goff, Jr., Ph.D. 
Chairperson, Department of History 
 
 
        
Max C. Poole, Ph.D. 
Dean, Cratis D. Williams School of Graduate Studies 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Yuxiu Wu 2016 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
NATIONALISM CONSTRUCTED AGAINST “OTHERS”: CHIAPAS’S ANTI- 
CHINESE MOVEMENT AND STATE FORMATION IN 
POSTREVOLUTIONARYMEXICO 
 
Yuxiu Wu 
B.A., Radford University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Dr. Jeffery Bortz 
 
 
A handful of historians such as Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Degaldo Robert Romero Chao, 
Juan Puig Schivonme, and Gerardo Rénique have provided a solid foundation for the studies 
of the Chinese in Mexico. Their studies have explored vast spans of themes regarding global 
migration, ethnic relations, Chinese settlement and resistance, and questions of national 
identity, etc. in Mexico. This thesis, while providing a review of the majority of this 
literature, discovered that most of the modern scholars focused on the early coolie labor and 
transnational movements of Chinese immigrants who settled mainly in northern Mexico and 
the borderland region. Few, except for M.L. Guillén, had conducted studies of the Chinese in 
the southern region of Mexico. One of the goals of this thesis is to remedy this northern focus 
and add to the works that focus on the southern regions of Mexico. 
From my research, I used the documents found in Achivo General de la Nación 
(AGN) on the anti-Chinese movements in Chiapas, a southern state of Mexico, to examine 
 v 
the motives and causes of the anti-Chinese movement in this remote region where the 
Chinese population was less dense.  
Drawing from the evidence, I argue that the anti-Chinese movement in the early 
1930s was linked to the newly established the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), the 
party that later became the party that dominated Mexican politics. The anti-Chinese 
movement in Chiapas also demonstrates the PNR’s indirect control and its need to negotiate 
power over the historically rebellious state. In addition, this thesis also applies the theories of 
Gerardo Rénique and Pierre Bourdieu on nation state building to this particular case of 
Mexican anti-Chinese movement in Chiapas and examines the apparatus for 
postrevolutionary state formation processes. I conclude that the new state incorporated the 
anti-Chinese movement as a means to accumulate various forms of political and social 
capital to enhance its legitimacy.  
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Chapter 1—Introduction 
 
 
Introduction  
Between 1910 and 1940, anti-Chinese movements were prevalent across Mexico. 
Violence, looting, persecution of the Chinese, and revolutionary fervor were the main themes 
of earlier studiesabout the Chinese in Mexico. Historians have sought to answer how and 
why the anti-Chinese movements happened; a few drew connections between racism and 
nationalism and acknowledged that the anti-Chinese movements were at the heart of the 
“race” and racial theories that played important roles in the shaping of Mexico during the 
revolution. 
Informed by new social theories, particularly the deconstruction of the nation-state, 
more recent studies have revisited the history of Chinese migration to Mexico from new 
perspectives. Many looked at transnational networks and border history to decentralize the 
narratives confined by the boundaries of nation states and attempted to give subalterns a 
voice or agency, which drove new scholarship to focus on the journey and experience of 
Chinese immigrants and their families. On the other hand, some historiansexamined the 
racial theories that were important during the revolution and analyzed the development of 
such theories during the postrevolutionary era, in which race had provided the new Mexican 
state with more diversified conceptual tools and apparatuses to centralize power. Among a 
handful of historians who studied the anti-Chinese movement as part of the nation building 
project, Gerardo Rénique pointed out the importance of anti-Chinese ideology and its role in 
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the creation of consent in the “unstable equilibrium” that shaped Mexican politics between 
1928 and 1934. Moreover, his study not only deepened our understanding of themestizaje 
theories that informed the Mexican revolutionary nationalism through the anti-Chinese 
movements in Sonora, but also offered new insights on “the mechanisms and processes that 
transform and diffuse racial sentiments, perceptions and expectations into militant and 
politically organized racial movements.”1 
Drawing on Rénique’s argument, this thesis studies the anti-Chinese movements in 
the less examined southern state of Chiapas and further demonstrates the linkage between the 
anti-Chinese organizations and the state building projects of the postrevolutionary 
government, offering a more nuanced look at the interplay between the central government 
and the periphery. In 1929, differing from the anti-Chinese actions during the Mexican 
Revolution (1911-1920), the sudden surge of the anti-Chinese movement in Chiapas was not 
purely, if at all, a reaction to the popular unrest but rather engineered by a more interlinked 
network that responds to the central government, specifically, the newly formed Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) and its representatives in the Congress, the Bloque Nacional 
Revolucionario (BNR). In addition, this thesis uses Pierre Bourdieu’s classic theories 
aboutthe genesis of the State and forms of capital to analyze the development of anti-Chinese 
movements in Chiapas and the intricate state formation process. Drawing from these theories, 
I argue that the central state does not always rely on its physical forces but rather the 
symbolic power to strengthen its legitimacy.  
 
                                                        
1 GerardoRénique, “Race, Mestizaje and Nationalism Sonora’s Anti-Chinese 
Movement and State Formation in Post-revolutionary México.” Political Power & Social 
Theory 14 (2000): 91. 
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For this study, aside from governmental sources from the Archivo General de 
laNación (AGN), I also utilized the published sources of anti-Chinese activities in Mexico 
from the Guoshiguan (the National Historical Archive) in Taiwan, which are rarely 
mentioned in other scholarly works on the Chinese in Mexico, as most studies use Spanish 
and English sources. This thesis aims to use the story of the Chinese in the state of Chiapas, a 
remote state at the southeast corner of the country with a long history of rebellion, to 
investigate the nation-making in postrevolutionary Mexico. I argue that the federal 
government used racial ideology and grassroots organizations to bring remote and 
intransigent regions to the center; on the other hand, the Chiapas state negotiated power with 
the federal government by refusing to facilitate the anti-Chinese campaigns backed by the 
National Revolutionary Party (PNR). Building on Gerardo Rénique’s theories on race and 
state formation which illuminate the linkage between the anti-Chinese campaign in Sonora 
and the nation-building project of the central government, this thesis also buttresses the 
concept that the federal government incorporated the anti-Chinese campaigns into the 
centralization project by analyzing the operations of the state-backed anti-Chinese movement 
in Chiapas.  
In Chapter one, I review the previous literature on the Chinese in Mexico. This 
chapter notes that the historiography over violence against the Chinese community gradually 
shifted from the focus on revolutionary xenophobic fervor from below to the analyses rooted 
in race and nationalism. In newer studies, while many revisited the anti-Chinese movement 
from the Chinese perspective, some historians continued to bring the anti-Chinese 
movements to the discourse of Mexican nation and state building process, pointing out that  
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racial resentment of the Chinese offers an understanding of theracial ideologies constructed 
during and after the Mexican Revolution.  
In Chapter two, drawing on the ethnohistory tradition, the chapter provides 
background information of the journey of Chinese immigrants in Mexico, answering when, 
how, and why the Chinese came to Mexico. It also provides historical context surrounding 
the treatment of the Chinese immigrants tracing from the colonial time to the 
postrevolutionary era.  
In Chapter three, the thesis brings attention to Chiapas where the Chinese population 
was less dense than the north of Mexico. It briefly summarizes the history of Chiapas and its 
persistent struggle with the distant center. Then it details the origin of the anti-Chinese 
organizations in Chiapas and the ambivalent treatments of the Chinese from the state and 
federal governments, basing evidence on the gubernatorial correspondence. This chapter then 
parallels with Gerardo Rénique’s analysis on the anti-Chinese movements in Sonora and 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of state formation to draw further insights from the incident.  
Chapter four is a conclusion of my arguments and discussions of the success and 
limitation of my study. I also invite future investigations of the anti-Chinese organizations in 
the broader regions of Mexico in this chapter. 
Historiography 
The Chinese in Mexico as ethnohistory  
People from Asia came to Mexico as part of the Manila connections as early as the 
16th century. It was often the case during that time that all Asians were called “Chinos.” It 
was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Mexico began to form its own national 
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identity, that Asians, especially the Chinese, were present in such numbers as to create the 
conditions for conflict.  
Chinese Bondage in Peru: A history of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 1849-1874 (1951), 
by Watt Stewart, was the first book-length monograph on the Chinese journey in the 
Americas. The book addressed the “pathetic” conditions for the Chinese laborers in Peru and 
condemned that the journey of some ninety thousand Chinese coolies to Peru was a brutal 
and forced immigration.2 He also analyzed the historical conditions such as the devastation of 
Taiping War and the economic development of Peru for the cause of such “criminal” event.3 
Stewart’s book was a critical look at the earlier “Coolie Trade” that dominated many parts of 
former Spanish colonial regions. Such conditions and slave-like labor practice was also 
chronicled in John Kenneth Turner’s Barbarous Mexico(1911). Turner’s book first 
mentioned the Chinese coolie laborers in Porfirian Mexico. He lamented the exploitation of 
coolie laborers used for economic development on Yucatan plantations during the Porfiriato 
(1874-1911). The book was lauded as an eyewitness account of the national labor conditions 
of Mexico on the eve of revolution.4 While Turner’s study focused primarily on the Yaquis, 
the indigenous group living in Sonora and the Southwestern United States, the book also 
described the exploitation and enslavement of the Chinese or Korean laborers “owned” by 
the henequen kings.5 
                                                        
2 Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru: A History of the Chinese Coolie in Peru, 
1849-1894, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press ,1951), 229. 
3 Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru.  
4 Paul J. Vanderwood,review of Barbarous Mexico, by John Kenneth Turner, The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 50, no. 1 (1970), 156-157.  
5 Henequen kings refer to owners and slave-holders of the farms that produce 
henequen, or sisal hemp in Yucatan. John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous Mexico (University of 
Texas, 1969), 13.  
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Systematic studies of Chinese immigration in Mexico did not occur until the 1960s 
with the rise of ethnohistory, “the history of non-literate peoples as written by someone else,” 
or the study of peoples whose history was gleaned from the records of groups with whom 
they come into contact.6 Charles Cumberland spearheaded the study of the anti-Chinese 
movement in his article “The Sonora Chinese and Mexican Revolution.” The article focused 
on the Torreón Massacre in 1911 and anti-Chinese sentiment in the Mexican Revolution, 
connecting the violence against Chinese to the revolutionary process. In this type of study, 
Chinese immigrants were treated as a forgotten subject, and the violence against them was 
often fetishized.  
In 1971, Gordon V. Krutz published an article on Chinese coolie laborers and their 
expulsion from Sonora in 1931, in which he compared the setting of the event with similar 
situations in Peru, Thailand, the Philippines Islands, and the United States.7 Krutz used letters 
from the Arana papers (1904-1921)8 and a personal interview conducted with a Chinese 
person who lived in Guaymas at the time to demonstrate the dynamic process of prejudice 
against the Chinese in Sonora.9 Krutz pointed out the patterns in the reaction against foreign 
capital and the rise of nationalism. He argued, “the anti-Chinese campaign served to 
crystallize popular support, capitalized upon by politicians providing support for the removal 
                                                        
6 Bernard Fontana, “What is the Ethnohistory?,” Arizoniana, 2, no.1, (1961): 10. 
7 Gordon V. Krutz, “Chinese Labor, Economic Development and Social Relation,” 
Ethnohistory 18, no. 4 (1971): 321-333.  
8 The Arana papers are thecorrespondence between José Maria Arana (the prominent 
businessman and politician in Magdalena, Sonora, Mexico who spearheaded the anti-Chinese 
campaign in Mexico) and his supporters as well as opponents of the campaign in Sonora, 
Sinaloa, and Baja California. The papers included the official government communications, 
newspaper clippings, political campaign leaflets, and business letters, and can be found in the 
University of Arizona Libraries. 
9 Krutz, “Chinese Labor, Economic Development and Social Relation.” 
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of the Chinese as an economic threat.”10 In 1979, anthropologist Philip Dennis examined the 
Sonoran anti-Chinese campaigns further using an ethnohistorical framework and theorized 
about the role of ethnicity versus social class in the conflict; he argued that the antagonism 
rooted in economic inequality could be  magnified and sustained by the negative cultural 
symbols of group identity during the social conflict.11 
Following Cumberland and Krutz, in 1974, Leo Jacques provided a more detailed 
account of the Torreón Massacre with a deeper analysis of the anti-Chinese movements in 
Mexico’s northern states. He argued that it was the pent-up hostility against foreigners, 
nurtured during the Porfirio period, that erupted into the ten-hour bloodshed.12 According to 
Jacques, many Chinese immigrants began working as laborers and laundrymen but gradually 
moved into the ambulatory sales of vegetables and fruit. They invested the capital from these 
modest beginnings in wholesale and retail grocery trade and developed extensive credit ties 
with Chinese businessmen in the United States.13 In addition, many Chinese workers initially 
came to Torreón to work on the construction of railroads, in haciendas, and in the mines. 
Jacques argued that the economic successes in the Chinese community invited resentment 
from local people, thus shifting the focus of the historiography to the economic fortunes of 
the Chinese in Mexico. Leo Jacques also made a considerable contribution to the 
historiography by differentiating periods of the anti-Chinese movements. Although Jacques 
did not offer in-depth analysis for why such differences existed, he demonstrated that there 
                                                        
10 Krutz, 332. 
11 Philip A. Dennis,“The Anti-Chinese Campaigns in Sonora, Mexico,” Ethnohistory 
26, no.1 (1979): 65-80.  
12 Leo M. Dambourges Jacques, "The Chinese Massacre in Torreon (Coahuila) in 
1911," Arizona and the West (1974): 246. 
13 Jacques, “The Chinese Massacre in Torreón (Coahuila) in 1911,” 233-246.  
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were different triggers behind the waves of animosity against the Chinese immigrants, which 
directed later studies to emphasize the historical context of the anti-Chinese movements.  
Many early ethnohistorians studying the Chinese in Mexico tended to focus on the 
topic of violence on the Chinese immigrants; Evelyn Hu-Dehart, on the other hand, 
recognized the contribution of the Chinese in Mexico. Hu-Dehart asked the questions,how 
did the Chinese immigrants came into Mexico, and where and how did they settle in Mexico. 
More importantly, she extended the inquiry intothe reinvention of the Chinese identity in the 
context of national identities, the Chinese’s ascent in the social hierarchy, and their 
relationship to other ethnic and racial groups.14 She also highlighted the economic 
significance of the Chinese presence in Mexico and questioned the motives behind the 
persecution of the Chinese in the newly formed nation.15 She defined the Chinese in Mexico 
as middleman immigrants16 and petite bourgeoisie. She also noted that Chinese immigrants 
had wedged into the lower level of the Mexican economy.17 Hu-Dehart classified the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910 as the turning point for Mexican nationalism, “To the humble, 
dispossessed masses, [the Mexican Revolution] promised social justice; to all Mexicans, it 
                                                        
14 Some of the questions can be found in Evelyen Hu-DeHart, "Multiculturalism in 
Latin American Studies: Locating the "Asian" Immigrant; Or, Where Are the Chinos and 
Turcos?" Latin American Research Review 44, no. 2 (2009): 238. 
15 Evelyn Hu-DeHart, "Indispensable Enemy or Convenient Scapegoat? A Critical 
Examination of Sinophobia in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1870s to 1930s." Journal of 
Chinese Overseas 5, no. 1 (2009): 55-90; Evelyn Hu-Dehart, "Immigrants to a Developing 
Society: The Chinese in Northern Mexico, 1875–1932," The Journal of Arizona History 
(1980): 275-312. 
16 Middleman minority was a term coined by Hubert Blaclock (1967), referring to 
(marginalized) ethnic minority entrepreneurs who mediate the dominant and the subordinate 
groups. The term was usually associated with Jewish Immigrants. The term middleman 
minorities. Evelyn Hu-Dehart used the term “middleman immigrants” to describe Chinese 
immigrants as they mainlyoccupied professions such as shopkeepers, laundry in the middle 
sector that provided goods and services. 
17 Hu-DeHart "Immigrants to a Developing Society,” 276. 
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promised national control of the country’s resources and economy.”18 Chinese dominance in 
the local commerce became an embarrassment and allegedly blocked the advancement of 
members of middle and lower class Mexican nationals.19 Politicians used Chinese economic 
dominance as a scapegoat for  national problems and further exacerbated racial tensions.20 
Economic contribution during the Porfiriato 
Chinese economic contributions were most prominent during the Porfiriato period. 
However, only a few studies have centered their focus within this era. In “Chinese 
Immigrants in Porfirian Mexico: A Preliminary Study of Settlement, Economic Activity and 
Anti-Chinese Sentiment,” Raymond Craib explored factors such as economic disparity, the 
settlement pattern of Chinese communities and the racial prejudices that led to the Torreón 
massacre, adding cultural isolation and fear of contagious diseases among the reasons for 
singling out the Chinese as a target for xenophobic violence.21 Craib observed that the 
uniqueness of Chinese culture and the strong ties to their community also provided excuses 
for the cultural isolationist argument that Chinese were “unassimilable” into the Mexican 
national identity, which in turn, presumed that the Mexican identity had always been 
homogeneous. Nonetheless, he insisted that the antagonism was also rooted in some 
Chinese’s refusal to be integrated into the dominant Mexican society and to adopt its 
language, dresses, and customs.22 Although Craib conceded that many Chinese had adopted 
Hispanicized names for themselves as well as for their businesses, he insisted that the 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hu-DeHart, "Indispensable Enemy or Convenient Scapegoat?" 
21 Raymond Craib, “Chinese Immigrants in Porfirian Mexico: A Preliminary Study of 
Settlement, Economic Activity and Anti-Chinese Sentiment,” Research Paper SeriesNo. 
28Latin American and Iberian Institute.1996. 
22 Raymond Craib, “Re-‘covering’ Chinese in Mexico,” The American Philatelist 112, 
no. 5 (1998), 451. 
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distinctive organizations such as tongs in their own communities may have made their 
presence more prominent and outstanding.  
 Another important work on the Porfirian era was Forge of Progress, Crucible of 
Revolt by William K Meyers. The book presented "a coherent and materialist explanation of 
the inter-relationship between rapid economic development, social transformation, and 
political division" in the Laguna region of north-central Mexico.23 Meyers carefully wove the 
accountof Chinese immigration and anti-Chinese sentiments into a story of the rise of La 
Comarca Lagunera, the commercial area in Laguna developed during the Porifirato, and the 
forging of a people by the Mexican Revolution. In particular, the book illustrated the role of 
Chinese merchants and capitalists in the development of La Comarca Lagunera during the 
Porfiriato and economic crises that fomented anger among working class people against the 
Chinese and the Porfiriato. Sinophobia thus was part of the resistance against the xenophilia 
of the Porfiriato.24 By examining the growing discontent against the Porfiriato by the 
working class through the pent-up xenophobia in the society, Meyers' work situated Chinese 
immigration to Torreón in the regional history of the pre-revolutionary Mexican nation and 
simultaneously broadened the scope of the regional historiography of Porfirian Mexico in the 
late 19th century.  
Racism and the nation  
A reaction against perceived Chinese economic dominance alone does not explain the 
anti-Chinese violence committed during and after the Mexican revolution. Race had played 
                                                        
23 Paul Garner, review of Forge of Progress, Crucible of Revolt: The Origins of the 
Mexican Revolution in La Comarca Lagunera, 1880-I911, by William K. Meyers,Journal of 
Latin American Studies 28, no. 1 (1996): 245-246.  
24 William K. Meyers, Forge of Progress, Crucible of Revolt (New Mexico: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1994).  
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an important role in the process. Since the 1970s, historians have been increasingly aware of 
the role race has played in the shaping of Mexico. In fact, race was central to the ideology of 
the Mexican revolution and the nation building project during the postrevolutionary period 
(1920-1940). In addition to economic motivations, scholars have looked into the effects of 
social Darwinism and the racist practice of mestizaje, race mixing, as explanation for specific 
xenophobic attitudes and persecutions of Chinese immigrants. Anti-Chinese racism is the flip 
side of the indianismo,25 as a product of the revolutionary movement; indigenismo itself can 
be seen as a reactionary methodology against the Porfiriato racism. Alan Knight noted that 
racism and xenophobia had circumvented the real agent of economic imperialism from the 
U.S. and Britain during the Mexican Revolution and provided a strong ideological basis for 
the economically motivated riots.26 Evelyn Hu-Dehart also argued that Chinese immigrants 
were scapegoats during the economic recession, and revolutionaries and local politicians 
used racism to mobilize the working-class Mexicans to persecute of the Chinese and their 
business for monetary gains.27 To her, the ulterior motive behind the expulsion and the 
treatment of Chinese immigrants was economic, while racism was used to justify the blunt 
confiscation of their property and wealth.28 The anti-Chinese movements provided a 
scapegoat for the national economy which was in crisis. On the other hand, Alan Knight 
argued that race was an important part of the revolutionary project and was fundamentally 
                                                        
25 Indianismo or Indianism Indianismo is an ideology and tendency to see Indigenous 
culture and identity as a significant part of the national tradition and culture, which was 
glorified and embraced by the intellectuals and revolutionaries during the 1920s and 1930s. 
26 Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Volume I, Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),208. 
27  Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “Racism and Anti-Chinese Persecution in Sonora, Mexico 
1876-1932,” Amerasia Journal  9, no. 2 (1982): 1-27 
28 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “Racism and Anti-Chinese Persecution in Sonora.” 
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linked to not only capitalism, but more importantly, nationalism.29 He claimed that 
Sinophobia was the clearest example of xenophobia and was "functionally related to 
indigenista nationalism."30  Knight argued that indigenismo and Sinophobia were 
interdependent and that they were the two faces of revolutionary nationalism. While 
Indigenismo allowed for a united identity against the Spanish in the traditional 
Indian/Spaniards polarity, Sinophobia cleansed the unwanted race, as nationalism is 
fundamentally exclusive.31 
Similarly, his 1991 book, El Movimiento Antichino en México, 1871-1934: 
Problemas del Racismo y del Nacionalismo Durante La Revolución Mexicana (Problems of 
Racism and Nationalism during the Mexican Revolution), José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo 
documented the development of the anti-Chinese movement in Mexico during the nineteenth 
and primarily the twentieth century. He analyzed the regimes that emerged from the 1910 
Revolution and how they used racial prejudice against the Chinese immigration to obfuscate 
their inability to meet demands of land, freedom, and justice.32 Gómez’s study provides an 
important link between the anti-Chinese movement and nationalism, and elucidated how the 
Mexican state utilized the movement as an apparatus to deflect attention from the regeime’s 
failures.  
Juan Puig also made an important contribution to the subject of race and anti-Chinese 
violence during the Mexican Revolution. Reconstructing the event, Juan Puig’s Entre El Río 
                                                        
29 Alan Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940," in The 
Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940, ed. by Richard Graham (Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, 1990).  
30 Alan Knight, “Race, Revolution, and Indigenismo,”96.  
31 Ibid.  
32 José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, El Movimiento Antichino en México, 1871-1934 : 
Problemas del Racismo y del Nacionalismo Durante La Revolución Mexicana (Mexico: 
INAH, 1991).  
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Perla y el Nazas (Between the Peal and the Nazas River; 1992) remains the most 
comprehensive examination of the Torreón massacre.33 Puig reconstructed the 1911 massacre 
of the Chinese based on sources from Archivo Histórico “Genaro Estrada” de la Secretaría de 
Relaciones Exteriore (“Generao Estrada” Historical Archives of Secretariat of Foreign 
Affairs) in Tlatelolco, D.F., Mexico.34 Instead of attributing the violence on the Chinese to 
the revolutionary fervor like many historians before him, Puig analyzed the distinctiveness of 
Chinese organizations such as Bao Huang Hui and emphasized the racial reasons behind the 
massacre.  
Border and transnational studies 
More recently, responding to a new wave of post-colonial and post modernism (social 
constructivism) theories and diaspora studies, many scholars have looked for new ways to 
construct narratives on Chinese immigration overseas. This new scholarship has centered on 
identity relations and nation building. In “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the 
Americas,” Erika Lee called for studies of how race and national identity was constructed.35 
Instead of focusing on explanations for violence and persecution against the Chinese 
community, she instead asked how race became a global construct and how ideas about racial 
difference, inferiority, and identity are related to the global migration of labor, capital, and 
culture. Lee called for transnational studies to understand the “globality of race,” which she 
tied race to both global flows and the processes of nation-building.36 
                                                        
33 Jun Puig, Entre el Río Perla y el Nazas: La China Decimonónica y Sus Braceros 
Emigrantes, la Colonia China de Torreón y la Matanza de 1911 (D.F, México: Dirección 
General de Publicaciones del Consejo Nacional Para la Cultura y las Artes, 1992).   
34 Puig, Entre el Río Perla y el Nazas. 
35 Erika Lee, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Americas,” Pacific 
Historical Review, 76, no. 4 (2007): 537-562. 
36 Lee, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Americas.”  
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From an anthropological standpoint, Kanji Sato expounded on Alan Knight’s work on 
race formation in revolutionary Mexico and re-conceptualized the idea of "La Raza." She 
highlighted anti-Chinese movements in the formation of La Raza, the racial construction 
popular among the Mexican intellectuals during the Mexican Revolution, which implied that 
all Mexicans are ethnically homogeneous.37 She argued that differentiation of the Chinese 
helped in forming the Mexican national identity. In Mexico, nationalist rhetoric insisted that 
La Raza was formed by two peoples: indigenous Mexicans and non-indigenous Mexicans. 
By excluding the Chinese as the antithesis of the national race, they were able to bring 
together other races or cultural groups in Mexico. Moreover, her essay also challenged the 
Hispanic-America and Anglo-America divide through the Chinese migration between 
Mexico and the United States. She noted that in both nations, the anti-Chinese ideology and 
policies were used by nationalists to solidify national identity, even though the expulsion of 
the Chinese in Mexico was in part due to their association with the U.S. She therefore called 
for more studies across the border by pointing out the similar experience Chinese immigrants 
had in both countries during the expulsion period.38 Francisco Haro Navejas had also posed 
theories about multi-centralism, calling for decentralizing the focus on the nation state and 
letting the periphery tell the story of the center. While acknowledging that the xenophobia-
xenophile duet remained a two faced coin of the complex and heterogeneous Mexicanness, 
he argued that the roles of Chinese immigration in Mexico could be important in the 
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deepening process of regional integration.39 To Navejas, Chinese immigrants were important 
actors who encouraged the flexibility of capitalism, economic growth, and identity 
building.40 
Further decentralizing the nation-state narratives, Avital H. Bloch and Servando 
Ortoll, professors from University of Colima and Baja California, have looked into the 
Mexican-US borderland and addressed the questions of how the anti-Asian movement spread 
in the borderland regions. They analyzed the instigation of the extreme actions against the 
Chinese and Japanese and asserted that agitation in opposition to the Chinese and Japanese 
presence was a transnational phenomenon. The “anti-Oriental” racism was not unique to one 
nation or country. Bloch and Ortoll argued that racist ideology and hatred for non-European 
newcomers tended to spread past national boundaries, despite the presumed cultural 
historical differences between them.41 These studies challenged the nation-centered 
narratives and redirected the attention to the porous borderlands and fluid nature of nations.   
Continuing to emphasize the borderland and transnational character of the Chinese 
immigration to Mexico, recent book-length treatments of the Chinese in Mexico have paid 
close attention to the transnational patterns and the tendency to tell the migration story from 
subaltern perspective. Robert Chao Romero’s The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940 has been 
lauded as the first book-length English-language monograph on Chinese immigrants in 
Mexico and has helped fill the gap in the historiography by engaging broad sources from the 
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U.S., Mexican, and Taiwanese archives.42 Romero stressed that the broad spectrum of 
employment of Chinese immigrants, instead of their role simply as petite bourgeois 
merchants in the Mexican commercial sector, gave more depth to the network of Chinese 
settlement in the country. More importantly, Chao Romero noted that previous scholarship 
tended to fetishize xenophobic violence and the anti-Chinese campaigns. By contrast, he 
refused to depict Chinese immigrants as passive victims; instead, he utilized previously 
omitted source materials such as court cases to highlight Chinese immigrants’ action in 
fighting for their acceptance and rights as Mexican citizens. Romero’s study moved past the 
racism paradigm by focusing on the social economic patterns of the Chinese settlement and 
their transnational network and therefore humanized Chinese immigrants.  
In a similar vein, Julia Maria Schiavone Camacho traced the paths of Chinese men 
and women’s journey from their homeland to Mexico and told the story of how Chinese 
immigrants developed their Mexican national identity through family networks. Calling upon 
gender theories, Schiavone Camacho also brought attention to cases where Mexican women 
challenged their legal status after being stripped of Mexican citizenship because they married 
Chinese men. Furthermore, she recounted the repatriation of Chinese Mexicans between the 
1930s and the1960s, illustrating that the Chinese Mexican men and women who had left 
Mexico with strong regional identities re-claimed their national cultural belonging and 
Mexican identity despite the violence and persecution. Camacho’s work therefore challenged 
traditional narratives that centered on the nation-state by placing the postrevolutionary and 
postwar Mexico in a larger trans-Pacific framework. Her story of Chinese immigration also 
shed light on the formation of the Mexican nation and how it sought legitimacy through the 
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delineation of citizenship. More importantly, Camacho answered how the Chinese 
immigrants formed their new national and transnational identity through the interaction with 
the United States, Mexico, and Chinese immigration agencies.43 
In Making the Chinese Mexican, Grace Delgado also turned away from nation-
centered history and pushed the boundaries into other realms. She recognized the omission of 
Chinese fronterizos from U.S.-Mexico borderlands history and employed sources from the 
border region where individuals and community created identities. Delgado reconstructed the 
stories by drawing on personal accounts from biographical materials and letters, in addition 
to traditional archival sources. Moreover, her story of the borderlands showed that the origins 
of the modern U.S.-Mexican border “were wrought from overlapping worlds of empires and 
alternative visions of national belongings.” 44 The heightened nationalism of both U.S. and 
Mexico resulted in the immigration bureaucracies on both side of the border and the ridding 
of the Chinese fronterizos who were established in the region. Her work also demonstrated 
how the racial structure and immigration bureaucracies of each nation defined who were 
allowed to enter and who were not, questioning the nature and failings nation-states by 
confronting the fixity of the borders. 
Jason Oliver Chang, too, has focused on the U.S.-Mexican frontier and border 
formation. He described how Chinese farmers and merchants established the city of Mexicali 
in Baja California as a cotton-growing enclave at the turn of the twentieth century.45 Chang 
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called for the adoption of a trans-Pacific conceptual framework to understand Chinese 
communities in the formation of the U.S.-Mexico border. He argued that U.S. imperial 
aggression and the trans-Pacific Spanish Galleon trade together permitted the Chinese 
migrations to the Americas. Like many previous scholars, he was also interested in the racial 
boundaries of postrevolutionary Mexican nationalism and argued that the Mexican state 
considered the Chinese in Mexicali as an imminent threat. Most interestingly, Chang noted 
that not only did the government try to control the Chinese population in Mexicali, it also 
unleashed a series of racial programs of Mexicanización that attempted to expunge the 
Chinese community from public memory.46 Chang’s study not only explained the formation 
of borders in nation states but also shed important light on the state’s role in the construction 
of public memory.  
Building on previous scholarship on transnationalism and sociological theories, in his 
book Alien Nation, Elliot Young made the trajectory of the migrations visible by tracing 
Chinese migration to the Americas and their clandestine migratory routes throughGreater 
North America. By tracing these paths, Young rejected the nation-state gaze on agencies 
designed to make the national boundaries fixed and legible. Reflecting on sociological and 
psychological theories, Young demonstrated that the Chinese not only bore the stigma of 
“aliens” but were also enmeshed in a series of governmental bureaucratic agencies such as 
immigration authorities that rendered them “illegal.”47 In other words, the development of 
“illegal aliens” produced the perceptions of the Chinese as both cultural foreigners and 
outlaws.  
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Additionally, Young reviewed the failings of nation-state programs through the 
examination of policies towards Chinese immigrants. He argued that Porfirio’s policies and 
regulations over Chinese immigrants failed to grant legitimacy to the state and its 
bureaucracy because it was not well-enforced and therefore failed to make the society 
“legible.”48 Young stated, “The weakness of the Porfirian state and the chaos of the 
revolutionary period rendered the new immigration laws and the nascent bureaucracy 
ineffectual. In the absence of state controls on Chinese popular vigilantes and revolutionary 
soldiers stepped in to assume the government’s disciplining function.”49 The revolutionary 
soldiers seized the opportunity to assert their role in the new state by persecuting the 
Chinese—in this way, Young illuminated the fall and rise of Mexico’s nation building 
projects through the examination of the peripheral story of Chinese migrants.  
Drawing on postcolonial theories and narrativesfrom subaltern perspectives, Fredy 
González brought attention to the less examined diaspora in Baja California. His 2013 
dissertation, We Won’t Be Bullied Anymore, documented the twentieth-century history of 
Chinese immigrants to Mexico and the anti-Chinese campaigns from the early 1930s to 1972, 
when Mexico officially recognized the People’s Republic of China. González turned to the 
failed Ensenada (Baja California) Campaign of 1934 and showed how Chinese residents 
organized resistance against their attackers by appealing to consular offices in China for 
protection. González used both Chinese and Spanish sources from China, Taiwan, and 
Mexico to delineate the complicated ways in which global, national, and local forces 
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intersected one another and shaped the Chinese immigration experience.50 Moreover, 
González’s work made an important contribution to the field by focusing on the little 
examined anti-Chinese campaigns that failed. Moreover, his use of sources from diverse 
regions helped narrate a story that shaped the subalterns as heroes, not passive victims. 
Postrevolutionarystate formation  
On the flip side of the story, the Chinese in Mexico have been studied as a means to 
examine the Mexican state. In recent studies, many historians analyzed the anti-Chinese 
campaigns as part of the formation of the Mexican state in the postrevolutionary period.  
Many studies have focused on the deconstruction of the nation-state and the process of state 
formation. Instead of examining the efforts of Chinese immigrants themselves, they looked at 
how the treatment of Chinese immigrants fit into the narrative of postrevolutionary state 
formation. Following the avalanche of mostly regional studies of the 70s and the 80s, newer 
studies paid special attention to the relationship between the revolution and the state, 
concluding that the revolution had informed the cultural change necessary for state 
building.51 As Walter Mingolo stated, racism was an epistemic maneuver used by actors to 
assert hegemonic dominance.52 Building on Alan Knight’s work on race and nationalism, 
Gerardo Rénique’s article, “Race, Mestizaje and Nationalism: Sonora’s Anti-Chinese 
Movement and State Formation in Post-revolutionary México State Formation,” examined 
the history and causality of the anti-Chinese campaigns and their incorporation within the 
new orthodoxy of the postrevolutionary state. Rénique argued that the Sonoran anti-Chinese 
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movement was supported by Mexico’s official postrevolutionary party as part of the 
nationalista campaign. In particular, he found the anti-Chinese ideology relevant to “the 
resolution of the hegemonic struggle between the two dominant Sonoran caudillos Plutarco 
Elias Calles and Alvaro Obregón.”53 He believed that the anti-Chinese campaign was part of 
their strategies to centralize government and demonstrated the shift in national politics. 
Rénique therefore framed the grass-root ethnic persecution as a “cultural revolution” of the 
postrevolutionary state. He claimed that the anti-Chinese ideology, as part of the nationalist 
projects of the Sonoran revolutionary faction, shaped Mexican politics between 1928 and 
1934 significantly by generating “actions for creation of consent in the ‘unstable 
equilibrium’.”54 Rénique’s analysis made an important contribution to the state formation 
period of Mexico by incorporating the interrelations between the anti-Chinese movement to 
the Mestizaje theories into the Mexican revolutionary nationalism and reexamined the story 
of the central state through the evolution of politics regarding Chinese immigrants in Sonora.  
In light of the relations between race and state formation, David FitzGerald and David 
Cook-Martín held the view that racist immigration policies informed and interacted with 
liberal democracy and therefore dispelled the presumption that liberal democracy and racism 
are mutually exclusive. In fact, according to FitzGerald and Cook-Martín, the resentment 
against a certain ethnicity from below fueled the exclusionary policies by the “populist” 
government striving to gain legitimacy.55 The racist and exclusionary policies against the 
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Chinese were very much reflective of Mexico’s state building project during the post-
revolutionary period. Another recent work, Inmigración y racismo.: Contribuciones a la 
historia de los extranjeros en México (Immigration and Racism: Contributions to the History 
of Foreigners in Mexico), compiled by Pablo Yankelevich, further broadened the conceptual 
frameworks and thematic repertoires in approaches to foreign migration in Mexico by 
applying different conceptual tools to the narratives. The book examined the history not only 
through the lens of social and political history but also through legal and cultural perspectives, 
such as the census and law, offering a more nuanced look at the complexity and ambiguities 
of the historical processes.56 
Legal and census studies  
Legal and census studies of Chinese immigrants in Mexico sometimes overlap with 
identity and immigration history. These studies often shed light on race construction and 
identity making ofthe nation. Moisés González Navarro’s Los extranjeros en México y los 
mexicanos en el extranjero, 1821-1970: 1910-1970 (1993), a comprehensive three volume 
compendium and encyclopedia of immigration and emigration history of Mexico since Santa 
Anna’s time, provided valuable data for Chinese immigration to Mexico by compiling and 
analyzing national census records and other primary sources.57 González compared the 
patterns of migrations of different ethnic groups and gave special attention to the motives and 
themes of sinophobias during the independence era and Porfiriato.He also examined the 
emigration of braceros (peasant workers) to the United States and demonstrated that the 
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foreigners, including the Chinese, were affected by the nationalist Mexican government and 
large popular sectors.58 Through these examination and analysis of interaction between 
different ethnic groups, González dissected the history of Mexico and confronted the idea of 
“extranjera” (foreigners) through the windows of emigration and immigration.  
Specific focus or a subgenre of Chinese immigration emerged from the traditional 
legal and census studies. Historians such as Pablo Yankelevich and Kif Augustin-Adams 
revisited the anti-Chinese movement from a legal perspective. In “Extranjeros indeseables en 
mexico (1911-1940): Una aproximacion cuantitativa a la aplicacion del articulo 33 
constitucional” (Undesirable Foreigners in Mexico 1911-1940: A Quantitative Approach to 
the Application of Article 33 of the Constitution), Yankelevich examined the application of 
article 33 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which restricted foreign immigration and 
granted the executive power absolute rights for expulsions of undesirable foreigners.59 
Yankelevich approached the deportation policy through an exploration of Mexico’s complex 
foreign relations from the start of Francisco I. Madero’s the Presidency (1911) to the end of 
the Government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1911-1935). He compared and contrasted the 
applications of the law on different foreign communities (Chinese, American, and Spaniards) 
and discovered the asymmetry of the enforcement of the law based on the revolutionary 
state’s relations with the community. Most importantly, the articled pointed out that although 
the law was fed by underlying social urges from the bottom, it helped Mexico to transition 
into an increasingly authoritarian state.60 By applying the law differently and broadly 
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according to the will of the state, the ruling party gained more power in defining the 
constitution.  
In a similar approach, Kif Augustin-Adams examined Law 31, the anti-miscegenation 
law that prohibited marriage between Mexican women and Chinese men and such couples’ 
petitions against the law. She argued that the discriminatory law made little impact in real life 
since the law suits were often struck down in lower courts when Mexican Chinese couples 
deployed amparo petitions to assert their constitutional rights. Her research therefore told 
“the complex story about constitutional interpretation, judicial process, federalism and 
national identity, on the one hand, and race, gender, marriage and family, on the other.”61 
In another study, Augustin-Adams looked into the 1930 census to search for the story 
of the making of Mexico. In 1930, Mexico joined the rest of the Latin America and 
eliminated race as a category in its census, using only “nationality” to document individuals’ 
national identities. She argued that thesketching of the census played a crucial part in the 
making of identities, “The official census count of the Chinese in the state of Sonora in 1930 
is a tale of the contested nature of reality, of the reification of race in a census with no 
question regarding racial identity, of the power and limitations of law to make and unmake 
citizens, to make the country.”62 She concluded that Chinese families suffered from “the 
grassroots attempt by individuals, census takers, and supervisors to record individual identity 
in a way law, society and the census survey form recognize.”63 The erroneous or “accurate” 
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count of the Chinese nationals and their children rendered them invisible in Mexico.64 Along 
the same line, Mara Loveman’s National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin 
America analyzed the connection among race, census, and state formation in Latin America 
by drawing attention to the region’s history of counting and classifying racial groups.65 
Chinese in Chiapas  
Most studies of Chinese migration and settlement in Mexico have focused on the 
northern states and the borderlands where the Chinese population concentrated. By contrast, 
Miguel Lisbona Guillén is one of the few historians who wrote extensively and exclusively 
about the Chinese immigrants in the southern state of Chiapas. In Allí donde lleguen las olas 
del mar (Where the Waves Reach: Past and present of the Chiapan Chinese), Lisbona 
documented the Chinese journey to Chiapas and the everyday lives they led, with little 
intention (or pretention) of academic theorizing. The book is a treatise on the evolution of the 
Mexican state and its immigration policies from the nineteenth century to the present. The 
first part of the book examined the social fabric of a "foreign" community in a new territory 
through the life stories of Chinese Chiapans collected via interviews. By exploring these 
migrants, the author showed that Chiapas’ culture had been influenced by Chinese 
immigrants. The second part of the book traced Chinese migration to Chiapas, the 
persecutions they faced, and their resistance to and survival of the nation-wide anti-Chinese 
movement. Notably, the author also compared the differences between anti-Chinese 
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movements in northern border states and the one in Chiapas, showcasing the relationship 
between the Chiapan and the central governments.66 
Rebeca Lau’s 2003 master’s thesis, “Memories of Origins/Origins of Memories,” 
delved into sociological aspects of the Chiapas Chinese community she grew up in. Her 
approach, using oral interview sources, offers first person accounts of the immigrants’ 
journey to the south and provides a more nuanced understanding of the formation and 
recreation of the immigrant culture.67 Through her interviews, Lau was able to capture the 
changes in accounts and collective memories over two generations. She observed that 
Chinese residents had been “assimilated” into Mexican culture within a few generations and 
concluded that identities were socially constructed and subject to change.68 
Conclusion 
While often overlooked, Chinese immigration to Mexico is an important part of 
understanding the racial attitudes that have played a major role in Mexico’s postrevolutionary 
nation-building process. The nation-state of Mexico did not exist when the Spanish arrived. 
In 1519, Cortez reached the coast of today’s Mexico and encountered indigenous (mainly 
Mayan) people. Through a series of conquests, the white-skinned Spaniards established 
dominance over the dark-skinned indigenous people and established their hierarchy based on 
the classification of race. During the colonial period, African slaves were brought to Mexico, 
further complicating the racial system. Intermarriage emerged and determined the identity 
and status of the people living in this society socially. During the independence and 
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progressive periods, mestizos69 came to solidify their power over the nation, and thanks to 
social Darwinism and positivism of the time, elites of the nation consciously worked within a 
racist ideology. Chinese immigrants first came to Mexico in the Progressive Era and became 
employed in the railroads and plantations, bringing further racial complexity to the nation 
where race was a predominant determinant in social reality. The Mexican Revolution not 
only overturned the existing social orders but also brought the latent racial tensions and 
conflicts to the surface and broadened the rifts in the social fabric. During the post-
revolutionary period, eager to create a new order,intellectuals glorified the concept of 
“mestizaje” and defined the Mexicans as the “cosmic race,” reifying the dominance of 
mestizos by embracing “Indianism.” While this new racial ideology embraced racial mixing, 
it also excluded certain races. Chinese immigrants were caught in this process of racial 
classification and nation making. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the cause and 
motives of the anti-Chinese movement and how this movement was enmeshed with Mexico’s 
nation building process and the establishment of new orthodoxy of the postrevolutionary 
state.  
Many have suggestedthat the exclusion of Chinese may stem from economic and 
cultural reasons. Some, however, argued that the process of racial exclusion was part of 
social and state engineering. While the subject of this thesis may be the anti-Chinese 
movement in Mexico during the postrevolutionary period, the focus is not so much on the 
root cause of societal racial tension, as often examined, but rather, the behavior of the central 
and state governments and how race was not so much a reason, but a mechanism that was 
employed to explore and establish ties between the central and regional powers. 
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Chapter 2—History of the Chinese in Mexico 
 
 
Immigrants are often scapegoated in times of crises and internal struggle. The 
nineteenth-century yellow perilism offered colonial powers ideologies to carve up China, 
while Chinese laborers became a force to replace slavery in the world market. The increasing 
globalization of trade, labor and ideas paved ways for both migrations and resistance to 
migrations. The aim of this chapter is to provide the historical context of how and why 
Chinese people immigrated to Mexico and what kind of lives they established for themselves 
in the new world far away from their original home. Moreover, this chapter tells the story of 
the evolution of the Mexican state with regard to the interaction between Chinese immigrants 
and the Mexican government. Specifically, this chapter will illustrate the factors that led to 
the intensive violence against Chinese immigrants locally and regionally and how it escalated 
to the national scale.  
Colonial Era 
Shortly after the Spanish colonized Manila as a trading post for China’s silver in 
1571, Spanish merchants quickly began to employ Chinese as servants and personal 
assistants and became depended on them for personal service and food. The Manila galleon 
trade brought luxurious goods and some men from the East to New Spain, now Mexico, in 
exchange for  
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Mexican silver.70  Some of the Chinese laborers came with the Spanish Manila galleons to 
New Spain and established their own colony or community soon after.71 
The earliest evidence of a Chinese colony in Mexico can be traced back to the 1630s. 
A document found in Mexico City showed that a group of Spaniards had complained against 
the business practice of Chinese barbers and claimed that they are an “inconvenience” to the 
“Republic.”72 The city commended limitations on the number of Chinese barbers and their 
eviction to the suburbs because the “excess” of Chinese barbers suddenly monopolized the 
trade after many Spanish barbers died from diseases. The Viceroy also considered the 
prohibition of Chinese barbers in general.73 
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the city of Manila expelled or massacred Chinese on 
several occasions throughout the 1600s. Three significant documented massacres occurred in 
1603, 1639 and 1662.74 In Manila, between 1639 and 1640, 20,000 died in anti-Chinese 
violence and many were expelled, in part because the Spaniards could not repay their 
Chinese creditors. In 1686, worried about an attack from the collapsing regime in Taiwan, 
Spanish royalty issued an order to expel a large number of ships arriving with new 
immigrants to Manila.75 
Whether the incidents in Manila were related to the complaints in the New World 
remains unknown. However, persecution against the Chinese, inspired by racial concerns in 
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the Spanish-ruled world, was not uncommon in the colonial period. Chinese immigrants did  
not become prominent in the Spanish American colonies until the mid-nineteenth century, 
when they were introduced as indentured coolies. 
Chinese in the Americas during the Coolie Era 
The recruitment of indentured Chinese labor in the so called coolie trade was done as 
a replacement for the loss of labor as the African slave trade and slavery began to end by the 
middle of the nineteenth century. From 1840s to 1880s, Cantonese-speaking Chinese 
migrants from the Pearl River delta region of Guangdong Province came to the Americas for 
work under contract.76 Many came to the Americas because of the low standard of living 
caused by civil and foreign imperialist warfare in their home country. Changing diplomatic 
realities between China and the Western powers and the increasing labor demands in the 
industrializing Americas also incentivized the migration.  
During the mid-nineteenth century, China was undergoing political and social 
turmoil. The two Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860) forced China to open more ports, 
rendering the Qing state weak. The gigantic indemnities demanded by the British devastated 
the Qing Empire fiscally.77 The opening of treaty ports and introduction of ocean going 
shipping further altered the economic landscape by moving much of the trade from the Peal 
Delta to Shanghai and the open seas, which led to more unemployment of laborers in the 
southeast coast. Besides the Opium Wars, the Qing dynasty also faced a series of internal 
upheavals such as the Taiping Rebellion (1849-1864), during which 20 to 30 million died, 
and millions more displaced.78 In Guangdong province, the southern coast province where 
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most of the immigrants originated, the peasant revolt known as the Red Turban Rebellion 
erupted in 1854 and inspired secret societies such as the Triads to launch assaults upon city 
of Guangzhou. Many civilians lost their lives and livelihood during such turmoil.79 In China, 
life became so hard that fathers would sometimes cast their children into a river or abandon 
them on the public highway. People in positions of extreme poverty and hunger caused by 
the wars, plus their seafaring traditions, often welcomed the opportunity to migrate to a 
country on which “Providence with a liberal hand had conceded all its gifts.”80 The discovery 
of gold in California led some of the migrants to believe that they were being led to the 
“Gold Hills.”81 At least 1.5 million Chinese left southeast coast for a life elsewhere; about 
half a million had come to the Americas by 1882, half of which destined for the Anglo North 
America.82 
Other internal catalysts for the emigration included the change of Qing diplomatic 
and domestic policies. There were fewer protections provided by the Qing government 
because it refused to acknowledge the “sojourners” and established few diplomatic 
involvements with foreign nations. Many Chinese workers searching for better living 
conditions and hoping to bring wealth back home were attracted by the tales of wealth to be 
gained in the new lands.83 
Furthermore, the economic development and shortage of labor in the Americas 
offered opportunities. Coolie contract laborers were taken to the U.S., Peru, Cuba, Panama, 
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Brazil, or other parts of the Americas.84 More than 335,000 Chinese immigrants entered the 
U.S. between 1848 and 1882 alone.85 The intensive economic developments such as the 
building of “Pacific Railroad” demanded cheap laborers. Latin American states also needed 
more labor for their big economic projects. Between 1849 and 1874, 92,130 entered Peru to 
work in the guano deposits, railway construction, and sugar and cotton cultivation.86 In Cuba, 
thousands of Chinese laborers found employment on the sugar plantations; many also worked 
on the Panama Railway then under construction in Brazil.87 However, the mass migration of 
the Chinese into Mexico did not happen until the 1870s under the Porfiriato.  
The U.S. Exclusion Act 
The experience of Chinese immigrants in the U.S. was a long and arduous struggle 
from the beginning. One of the first naturalization laws enacted in the 1790s declared that 
only white aliens were eligible for naturalization. However, drawn by the boom of the Gold 
Rush, Chinese voluntary immigrants began arriving in California in the 1850s and quickly 
met hostility from the white natives. Mostly shut out of gold mining, Chinese came to work 
on the transcontinental railway construction. In 1870, the U.S. Congress passed a law that 
proclaimed Chinese immigrants in the U.S. ineligible for citizenship. In 1882, the 
Exclusionary Act suspended all entries of Chinese laborers to the U.Sfor ten years and 
prohibited the Chinese from becoming naturalized citizens; the act was later renewed and 
strengthened into law demanding large-scale deportation.88 It was also the first law in U.S. 
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history to exclude immigrants’ entrance based on race and class.89 Those Chinese who 
illegally came across the U.S./Mexican border were, as Robert Chao put it, “the first 
‘undocumented immigrants’ from Mexico.”90 It was not until 1898, as ruled by the Supreme 
Court in the case of U.S. v. Wong Kim Art, that Chinese descendants born in America were 
granted full citizenship. Further Chinese immigration to the U.S. was barred until 1943, when 
WWII reshaped the relationship between China and the U.S.91 
In fact, the Exclusion Act profoundly changed U.S. politics, not only with regards to 
immigration and the legitimacy of the state but also towards race formation and the 
racialization of immigration policies. Historian Erika Lee argues that Chinese exclusion 
reinforced the important role that the federal government was beginning to play in 
controlling race relations, immigration, immigrant communities, and citizenship. All modern 
“legitimization” and “controlling” aspects of the immigration policies can be traced back to 
the Exclusion Era policies.92 The 1882 act was also the first significant restrictive 
immigration law, setting the precedence to restrict a group of immigrants based on their race, 
nationality and class.93 Lee called the Exclusion Act the “watershed beyond its status.”94 The 
law also served as a prototype for discriminatory legislation later issued by the Mexican 
government.  
There are usually two arguments surrounding the causes of exclusion. The 
Californian thesis, which emphasized labor relations and claimed that the major drive of the 
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anti-Chinese movement stemmed from the working class white natives in California, 
connecting the exclusion of Chinese workers with the magnification of white working-class 
agency.95 This argument, however, as historian Andrew Gyory pointed out, did not explain 
how the law came to pass in the Congress and received nation-wide support.96 He argued, 
instead, that despite the fact that the Congress passed the Exclusion Act to placate workers’ 
demands and assuage the prevalent concerns about maintaining white “racial purity,” party 
politics were at the heart of this discriminatory law. In other words, the powerless and 
voiceless Chinese immigrants were pawns to break legislative stalemate in post Civil War 
America.97 Erika Lee concurred with the political significance of the passing of the anti-
Chinese acts, for it paved ways for the rise of Jim Crow in the 1880s.98 
The Exclusionary Act of 1882 was a major factor that pushed Chinese laborers to 
migrate into Latin America in the latter half of the nineteenth century. However, it also 
provided a powerful framework to racialize the threatening “others” and to exclude the 
undesirable aliens.99 The act and a series of subsequent exclusionary legislation influenced 
later treatment regarding Mexicans and the takeover and treatment of the Philippines. The 
exclusion of Chinese immigrants racialized the dimensions of the identity of the Chinese and 
other non-white races outside the U.S. national boundaries, which allowed the perpetuation 
of the East-West divide and solidified a “civic identity” of white Americans.100 As a result of 
the immigration restriction that was placed upon them by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 
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Chinese immigrants entered Mexico in search of employment opportunities. However, 
closing the gate to the U.S. also prompted a wave of migration to Mexico by the Chinese 
hoping to be smuggled into the U.S. In spite of the legal disenfranchisement, the number of 
the Chinese entering the United States surpassed that of the pre-exclusion period 
dramatically.101 Between 1882 and 1920, approximately 17,300 Chinese crossed the northern 
and southern borders into the U.S.102 
When Mexico later employed exclusionary laws to restrict or expel Chinese labor, 
parallel arguments were used. The voice of resentment against the Chinese was from below. 
Local merchants and native laborers formed anti-Chinista groups, emphasizing that the 
hatred was stemming from class as well as race. The question of Chinese immigrants was 
also used as a pretext to tighten the control of the U.S.-Mexican border in the state building 
process for both countries. Francisco Navejas pointed out that Chinese transnationalism 
presented a constant threat of “flexibility,” which debilitated the state, and therefore, the 
central power of the U.S. demanded Chinese migrants to stop entering the country from 
Mexico. On the other hand, the flow of the Chinese across the porous borders produced a 
multi-centric behavior, prompting Mexico and the U.S. to work together. In turn, when this 
flow abated, the bilateral Mexico-U.S. relations not only dipped further, but also reinforced 
both states’ structures and expectations.103 
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Porfiriato 
Meanwhile, at the height of the exclusion and expulsion of the Chinese in the U.S., in 
Mexico, the liberal policies of Porfirio Díaz embarked on modernizing Mexico, welcoming 
immigrants to move to the fast-developing country. 
In 1876, Porfirio Díaz finally came to powerafter a series of failed revolts, following 
the death of Benito Juarez, the champion of liberals seen as a civic paragon.104 Donned in 
liberal clothing, Porfirio Díaz embraced progressive principles that relied on an “emotional, 
nonxenophobic nationalism” for internal support and promised stability and progress in 
exchange for personalized and centralized power.105 During his regime, Díaz worked with 
Los Científicos, a close circle of technocrats and young intellectuals and professionals 
formed by Manuel Romero Rubio, and followed through on a series of modernization 
efforts—building infrastructures such as railroads and rationalizing the fiscal system, 
suppressing  internal customs barriers, and cutting the military budgets.106 For instance, Díaz 
instituted banking laws such as the Commercial Codes of 1884 and 1889 and the National 
Banking Law of 1897. These laws established common rules for the entire banking system, 
reducing privileges of the oligarchs.107 Besides the stringent domestic policies, Díaz also 
intervened with tariff policies to integrate Mexico into the global economy by implementing 
laws to both ensure and bound national activities.108 
                                                        
104 Colin MacLachlan and William Beezley, El Gran Pueblo:A History of Greater 
Mexico (New Jersey: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2004), 96. 
105 MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 95. 
106 Alan Knight, The Mexican History, Vol. 1., 21; Maclachlan and Beezley, El gran 
pueblo, 161. 
107 Steven Topik, “When the Periphery Became More Central: From Colonial Pact to 
Liberal Nationalism in Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914,” LSE Research Online.  
108 Edward Beatty, “Commercial Policy in Porfirian Mexico: The Structure of 
Protection,” in The Mexican Economy, 1870-1930, essays on the Economic History of 
 - 37 - 
Díaz’s immigration policies 
Immigration policies were part of Díaz’s “scientific” efforts to modernize the country. 
Fearing Mexico was becoming too Americanized, Porfirio and his Científicos looked to 
Europe for cultural and economic influence and thus opened up immigration. They hoped 
that these measures would attract more immigrants and businesses from Europe. Besides 
Europeans, they also considered the yanquisas allies of convenience against the 
conservatives, the puros, who adhered to Juarez’s federalism. In 1886, the Ley de Extranjeria 
y Naturalización guaranteed all foreigners including immigrants the same rights and 
privileges as Mexicans, although the government retained the right to expel any dangerous 
foreigners.109 Ley de Inmigración 1909 was a comprehensive immigration law, in which 
racial discrimination was forbidden. Although the liberal immigration policy assumed that 
the Europeans would constitute the main group of immigrants,110 it had stimulated the influx 
of the Chinese immigrating from the Mexico-U.S. border regions and from China via Cuba.  
In 1909, Porfirio’s regime passed a comprehensive law that invitedthe Chinese to 
come to Mexico.111 Instead of being an unintended consequence of an immigration policy 
designed to attract European immigrants and investments, the invitation to Chinese 
immigration was a call for cheap labor for economic development. Between 1867 and 1910, 
Mexico was developing an extensive export-oriented capitalist economy. Porfirio 
emphasized national strength through modernization and economic development.112 Mexico 
needed a labor force for massive development projects. Hence, Díaz defended the absolute  
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rights of the Chinese in Mexico, based on the 1857 Constitution, liberal principles,and the 
influence of Chinese political associations and networks.113 
In a report to the Congress in 1877, the Development Minister, Vicente Riva Palacio, 
remarked that the only colonists who could establish themselves or work on the coasts were  
the Asians.114 From 1884 to 1900, more than 13,000 Chinese people resided in Mexico, 
making Mexico the second largest Chinese population in Latin America, only behind 
Cuba.115 Another reason for the increase in Chinese population wasLa Suscripción del 
Tratado de Amistad, Comercio y Navegación(the Sino-Mexican Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce of 1899), which was signed to increase commerce with China and Japan. The 
number of the Chinese in Mexico had thus increased drastically.  
Chinese settlement and employment during the Porfiriato 
By 1900, large numbers of Chinese laborers worked on the Tehuantepec, the Mexican 
Central, and the Southern Pacific of Mexico railroads. Chinese were also employed in the 
cotton fields in Baja California Norte, settling in Mexicali and Ensenada.116 Some of them 
became self-employed in businesses such as grocery stores and quickly came to dominate 
shoe and clothing manufacturing, owning some of the largest mercantile establishments in 
Sonora.117 The anti-Chinese sentiment inflamed by the Chinese economic success started to 
set the stage for the violence during the revolutionary period.  
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Mexico also attracted the Chinese as a labor force to develop uninhabited, hot and 
humid areas as a participatory work force. Chinese immigrants faced resistance in certain 
areas. Historian John Kenneth Turner contended that the Díaz regime was a barbarous rule 
which engaged in systematic repression of laborers. He dubbed the Yucatan as “literal chattel 
slaveries” and claimed that labor exploitation became more prevalent and brutal under the 
Díaz regime.118 Turner argued that the violence carried out by the rurales (the rural police) 
and the jefe politicos(the regional bosses) were connected to the “Porfiriato machine” that 
systematically repressed the working people. He maintained that there was about three 
thousand “Chinese (Korean)” laborers in Yucatan treated as chattel slaves.119 Cotton planters 
in the Mexicali Valley of Baja California, where many Chinese immigrants established their 
communities, also seemed to have engaged in similar patterns of exploitation.  
Besides manual labor, many Chinese immigrants formed their own distribution 
networks and established businesses that met significant economic success, especially in the 
north. In fact, Chinese businesses were an integral part of the Mexican economy, as some 
Chinese started small businesses and invested capital in the northern part of the country. By 
1903, Chinese businesses owned at least ten of thirty-seven shoe factories in Sonora, 
producing over $100,000 (U.S.D.) in goods each year.120 Despite their small numbers, the 
Chinese contributed disproportionately to the Sonoran economy—they comprised only less  
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than two percent of the Sonoran population; nonetheless, they fulfilled a variety of needs by 
bringing merchandise and services to towns throughout Sonora.121 
Chinese immigrants created businesses, either individually or jointly, and hired 
compatriots who had just arrived to work in their stores; at times, they also employed 
Mexican women. Unlike the European immigrants with significant capital, some of the 
Chinese businesses were small, including street peddling and selling goods house by house, 
street by street.122 They also established themselves as small manufacturers, shopkeepers, and 
retail merchants, providing services such as laundry, tailoring, shoe repair, food preparation 
and hotels or boarding houses for single men.123 However, Mexico also drew Chinese 
merchants with capital to invest in the economy. Most of these merchants came from the 
United States.  
In fact, many of them resided within the American colonies in Mexico, which are 
small areas in Mexican regions where Americans established their territory for business and 
residency. Some of the American Chinese either considered themselves as Americans, or 
were recognized by the local Mexicans as yanquis, a less than affectionate term used for 
people from the United States. In Torreón, Wong Foon Chuck, a Chinese immigrant who 
arrived in Mexico in 1887, established himself as a leading importer and supplier of Chinese 
labor for various industries of both Mexico and the U.S. He also helped create the Compañía 
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Bancaria Chino y México in 1906 with the Chinese reformer in exile Kang Youwei.124 Other 
prominent Chinese businessmen included George Foo, a San Franciscan and a “charter 
member” of the American colony; Hop Lee, who turned his American restaurant into an 
entrepreneurial empire; and Sam Hing, a prominent Chinese-American who organized the 
Chinese coolie network and supplied contractors, railroad men, and plantation owners. 
Porfirio Díaz even recognized Sam Hing’s service and recommended his business for the 
Panama Canal project.125 Moreover, many of them dominated small, neighborhood shops. 
Clearly, prominent San Franciscan Chinese merchants played a key role in capital 
transactions and building networks for Chinese wholesale supplies within the transnational 
commercial orbit.126 
Chinese immigrants were present in many sectors of Mexican economy, supplying 
both capital and labor. However, their prominent status invited hostility against them. In 
1906, Quong Sang Lung and Fong Fo Qui, both merchants in Sonora, appealed to the 
governor of Sonora for compensation for attacks upon their businesses by strikers belonging 
to the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, a mining operation owned by United States 
companies. Both Lung’s and Qui’s companies were sacked by the strikers because they 
believed that Lung and Qui profited from the local industries and were catering to the mining 
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company.127 The Sonoran government responded to the Chinese merchants’ request on June 
29, 1906, stating that they would not be compensated for their loss because compensation 
was not the government’s responsibility.128 
The attraction of Chinese foreign capital and labor to Northern Mexico was 
concurrent to the rise of la Comarca Lagunera, an area south of the border region. This region 
was the focus for development during the Porfiriato for its natural resources and railroads, 
and a region where cash crop agriculture prospered. Torreón, as the heart of the area, did not 
exist until the 1880s. The rising of the town demanded labor and services as Americans and 
Germans set up plantations in the region.129 
Anti-Chinese Sentiments 
Rhetoric against the presence of Chinese merchants surfaced soon after Chinese 
businesses took off in northern Mexico. A Sonoran newspaper El Tráfico described Chinese 
immigrants as gamblers, opium smokers, and a people without a nation.130 The newspaper 
later accused the Chinese for having poor hygiene and being infected with contagious 
diseases. U.S. exclusion laws were cited to justify their disapproval of the immigrants in 
Sonora. Moreover, the editorial asserted that the action of exclusion was not against liberal 
principles: 
In the United States, a liberal country whose fundamental law gives foreigners the 
same prerogatives that our laws have, made an exception of the Chinese, subjecting 
them first to certain quarters, then prohibiting their entry into the country, and 
finally enacting laws that take away the right that [group of] foreigners have--to  
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nationalize/naturalize and contract [marriage] with women other than his race, even 
with Indians.131 
 
The predominant Yellow Perilism in the nineteenth century and Social Darwinism 
ideas, which passed for scientific thinking at the time, were visible in the anti-Chinese 
mantra. Many Mexican law makers inveighed against Chinese immigration based on racial 
denigration, with the same view they held of the Indian population of central and southern 
part of the country, whom they saw as alcoholic degenerates.132 While earlier in the era of 
Porfirato, Díaz had defended and protected Chinese immigrants, late in his regime, he 
discriminated against the Chinese by pointing to their “anti-national characters.” 133 In 1908, 
the Mexican Congress passed the first “selective” immigration law to restrict indentured 
Chinese workers.134 The act amended the Mexican Constitution’s article on Immigration and 
Sanitary Laws and mainly targeted the Asian immigrations.135 
However, some of the hatred was also rooted in economics. The foreigners, especially 
the Chinese, dominated small, neighborhood shops. These shopkeepers earned theanimosity 
of the workers, since the companies generally would not provide credit (even plantations 
would only rarely offer yearly credit, which had to be settled after the harvest). Workers  
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resented the high interest and higher prices charged by the Chinese and a few Spanish 
merchants.136 
Like in the Exclusion Era United States, Mexican politicians blamed Chinese 
shopkeepers for Mexican economic failures and used them as pawns to gain political 
currency.137The Mexican Liberal Party led by the anarchist Flores Magón brothers opposed 
Chinese migration in its 1906 electoral campaign, claiming that it harmed the interests of 
native workers. However, there were no effective means of restricting Chinese entry until the 
revolution and the populist governments that succeeded it.138 
Crisis of 1907  
 Economic instability agitated popular unrest, and many working class Mexicans saw 
foreign business interests as the culprits. In 1907, a panic on Wall Street touched off a 
monetary crisis and economic recession throughout the U.S. and Europe. At the same time, 
world market prices for silver, lead, and copper dropped significantly. Money for capital 
investment in Laguana began to tighten. In the midst of the monetary crisis, a drought caused 
a severe shortage of crops that not only exhausted food supplies to the market, but also fell 
short of feeding the workers. Numerous firms went bankrupt. The economic crises led to 
mass layoffs. In 1908, the region’s oldest textile mill la Amistadlaid off two thousand 
workers.139 
The crisis also prompted people to react. In face of socioeconomic instability, rising 
foreign influence, political dissent, and fiscal crisis, the Porfirian government gradually lost 
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its ability to rule. Crimes committed by the lower class flared up in towns. By the end of 
1907, robberies were common in wealthy neighborhoods and the most prosperous residents 
placed armed guards in front of their houses in defense against bandits.  
At the same time, the Chinese, distinctive in their looks and customs, bore the brunt 
of resentment. The worker’s reaction to the government’s weakness also allowed the Mexico 
Liberal Party (PLM), led by the Magon brothers, to bank on the popular discontent. The PLM 
pointed out that the foreigners possessed privileges in the society whereas working class 
people suffered during the crises. An article in El Mundo stated:  
Let’s call attention to the fact that we cannot compete against foreigners in 
commercial ventures; in fact, we cannot even come close. The sad and lamentable 
fact is that the prostration of our national commerce has created a situation in 
which Mexicans are replaced by foreign individuals and companies that 
monopolize our commerce and behave in the manner of conquerors in a conquered 
land.140 
 
In sum, the policies during the Porfiriato had encouraged Chinese immigration into 
Mexico; the success of the Chinese in Mexico and the successful transition of Chinese labor 
into the commercial class were a result of capital development of Porfirian Mexico. 
However, the distinctive customs and culture of the Chinese and their economic positions 
made them targets of the xenophobia that rose during recessions. Both the Mexican 
commercial class and members of the working class held biased views against Chinese 
immigrants. This anti-Chinista attitude aligned with anger towards the Porfirian government 
and its policies purportedly favoring the foreigners. These hostile attitudes against Chinese 
immigrants already fermenting under Díaz set the stage for the persecution and violence that 
ensued in the revolutionary period, culminating in the expulsion of Chinese people wholesale 
in the northern states during the postrevolutionary period. 
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Revolutionary Violence, 1911-1920 
On May 14, 1911, less than ten days after Cinco de Mayo, the Maderista 
revolutionaries stomped into Torreón, Chihuahua, joined by a mob of 4,000 local lower-class 
men and women, sacking and looting Chinese homes and businesses. 303 Chinese people 
were killed in a two-day bloodbath in the largest massacre of the Chinese in North 
America.141 The looting caused an estimated property damage of $850,000 (U.S.) and thus 
destroyed Mexico’s most prosperous Asian community.142 
Prior to the massacre, several events helped propagate anti-Chinese sentiment.  Most 
directly linked to the bloodshed was the anti-Chinese speech given by Jesus C. Flores, a 
stonemason and a follower of Francisco Madero. In the speech, Flores condemned Chinese 
immigrants for allegedly taking jobs from local women and exploited the Mexican working 
class. He also accused Chinese businesses of causing the national economic troubles, 
stressing that “it is necessary, even a patriotic duty, to finish with them.”143 
The Mexican Revolution undoubtedly fanned the flames of xenophobic sentiment in 
society and intensified the racial tension cultivated during the Porfiriato. Subsequently, the 
revolution unleashed a series of violent attacks against Chinese immigrants from both the 
working class and the commercial class. The Torreón Massacre was a climax of violence that 
resulted from the discontent of working class people against Díaz’s oligarchy and their anger 
over the economic recession. The violence against the Chinese echoed working-class 
Mexicans’ protests against the government that they believed to have caused their insecure 
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and impoverished situation.144 From mid-1907, violent episodes increased dramatically. 
Bandit raids against haciendas and mines multiplied, and the racial tolerance law passed in 
1909 was rejected with a vengeance during the revolution.145 Organizations of workers also 
demanded racial restrictions. The Mexican peasants and workers’ leagues often protested 
against Chinese merchants sometimes for selling goods at low prices, while other times for 
selling at high prices. The flip-flop complaints revealed disconnect between most Mexicans’ 
self-interest and their immigration preferences.146 For instance, Mexican mine laborers in 
1912 accused the Chinese of being traitors to their country. Many mine workers and other 
lower class members had organized numerous rallies against Chinese members of the 
Mexican lower classes. Women also participated in the process. Wives of Mexican mine 
laborers also sponsored a large anti-Chinese demonstration on Feb. 24, 1914 in Cananea, 
Sonora.  
The anti-Asian movement was framed in racist terms unrelated to the economy. The 
commercial class also aired their implicit anti-Chinese biases. As the crisis intensified, the 
Mexican commercial class directed their strong discontent at their Chinese competition and 
argued that the arrival of the Chinese had brought a weaker race into Mexico.147 Between 
1911 and 1919 alone, there were more than 500 cases of Chinese immigrants being killed by 
disgruntled soldiers during the early years of the Mexican Revolution, and eight hundred and 
fourteen Chinese were killed in various states throughout Mexico by soldiers or unknown 
individuals.148 
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During the early years of the Mexican Revolution, Chinese immigrants filed more 
than six hundred property claims totaling more than one million dollars in economic 
losses.149 Between July 19 and 29, 1919, looters sacked forty-four Chinese commercial 
houses in Cananea Sonora, robbing them of $527,752.90 (US) worth of cash and goods and 
deliberately destroying other articles that Mexicans would not usesuch as Chinese 
medicines.150 Furthermore, while Mexicans buried their dead in the cemetery, they prohibited 
the Chinese from doing so. Reportedly, some Mexican soldiers threw nude Chinese corpses 
into an open trench dug just for this purpose.151 
The resentment did not just come from revolutionary fervor from below; small 
businesses run by the commercial class also formed associations to go against the Chinese. In 
1916, Jose Maria Arana, a schoolteacher in the border city Magdalena, Sonora, gave a speech 
condemning the presence of the Chinese and thus launched an anti-Chinese campaign. In 
response, a small group of Mexican shopkeepers and entrepreneurs formed the Commercial 
Association of Businessman in an effort to eliminate the Chinese from Sonoran businesses. 
In Magdalena, Sonora, the year following Arana’s speech, it was clear that Arana and his 
follower shared a commitment to imposing and sustaining anti-Chinese rhetoric based on 
racial ideals that also subsumed women’s political equality as a target. They urged the 
Chineras and Chineros, Mexicans who protected and supported the Chinese, to break bonds 
with their Chinese relatives, friends, or associates. Arana campaigned across the northern 
states, and many had heard the speech in Nogales, Sonora. The explicit goal of their 
organization was the elimination of Chinese merchants through all available legal means. 
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The organized anti-Chinese campaigns eventually culminated in the expulsion of virtually 
the entire Chinese community from the state in 1931.152 
Arana’s actions signaled the beginning of an organized anti-Chinese movement. As 
Mexican men had left Magdalena to fight in the revolution or work in the U.S., some local 
people grumbled that Chinese men had filled the void—stealing both capital, jobs, and 
women. In other border states, anti-Chinese organizations such as the National Anti-Chinese 
Worker League (or the People-for the Race) in Tamaulipas was organized against the “Asian 
invasion.” The local populace was worried that the Chinese had moved up the economic 
ladder from mining and agricultural work to petty commerce.153 
Some Sonoran women became powerful anti-Chinese proponents. In 1917, Professor 
Maria de Jesus Valdez rallied a group of women in Magdalena to urge women to join the 
revolution, declaring, “the sacrosanct call of patriotism also burns in women’s hearts.”154 She 
ended her talk with a warning about the Chinese and argued that Chinese exclusion laws 
would raise Mexico’s stature in the international order: “Other civilized nations won’t permit 
the entry of the Chinese. They throw him out like poisonous plants, which is what we must 
do in order to place Mexico among these nations.”155 
The local authorities also tried to use existing laws to harass Chinese residents as a 
response to Jose Arana and his followers’ anti-Chinese rant. In a letter to Jose Arana in 1919, 
the mayor of Cananea wrote: “The Chinese who violate the Labor Laws, those I ordered to 
clean the public jail [sic], asked for relief, and the matter is being addressed. The general 
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belief is that it will be granted.”156 Actively showing his dislike for the Chinese, the mayor 
illegally forced those jailed to clean up the prison.157 The campaign also pressed for laws 
restricting new Chinese immigration on the state level to be passed. 
On March 15th 1916, J. R. Chon, a representative of Colonia China de Cocorit, 
Sonora, protested to the governor of Sonora and the municipal president of Cocorit that his 
businesses were attacked first by the Yaquis and then the Constitutionistas. In his letter of 
complaints, he also mentioned that the city had asked the Chinese merchants to abandon their 
shops, in which they lived, and to change their residence to the edge of the town. Chon 
bemoaned:  
On the other hand, the portions where the order tells us to change our residencies, 
they lack houses, and leaving us in extreme poverty after lootings; when we just 
began back to work slowly? Where do we obtain the necessary capital to build 
fincas to live? For us, we are used to work in the town center unconcerned of living 
than living at the edge if we could [possibly] find house to rent; but there is nothing 
[for rent], or [anything] that we can build. Ordering us to move means almost an 
expulsion.158 
The letter also asserted that it was strange and painful for the state governor to approve such 
a provision that only related to this town. In another letter to the North American Consul,  
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Louis Hostetter, on March 25 of 1916, Chon expressed disbelief of the Chinese community 
that such violence and violation could be condoned by the Mexican government.159 
The local persecution of the Chinese might reflect the state’s new provisions 
regarding labor. The change of policies towards the foreign establishments emerged after 
Venustiano Carranza took over the government. In January 1915, Carranza instituted an 
amendment to the 1857 Constitution, giving the nationalgovernment the right to legislate on 
mining, commercial, andlabor issues. Gradually labor assumed an organized andindependent 
role in the country after a pact betweenCarranza and the Casa del Obrero Mundial, 
whichpromised to support the president in return for laws toprotect workers. From this base, 
labor brought its plight tothe nation and established its need for privileges andguarantees in 
the constitution. Chinese organizations and other foreign establishments, therefore, lost their 
privileges. With state guarantees and protection, organized labor, one of the most powerful 
enemies of foreign business control, assumed a prominentrole in the new order.160 
From 1916-1921, various Sonora governors legalized or ordered various assaults on 
the Chinese immigrants and implemented policies against their establishments. During the 
revolutionary era, we do see sporadic attempts at regional protections, but the anti-Chinista 
movement became more boisterous as it went national in the 1920s, when the central 
government regained its grip on power and was ready to oppose the Chinese in Mexico as a 
tool to centralize power. 
Rallies gave support to violence and the Jose Arana’s pro-patria movement achieved 
its highest intensity during the first decade of the revolutionary period in the north. The effort 
to expel and persecute Chinese during the revolution was largely popular and coming from 
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below. Such movements quickly spread nationwide during the postrevolutionary period, 
when popular xenophobia became enmeshed with the state’s desire to centralize control over 
the nation. The persecution of Chinese merchants and commercial establishments therefore 
increased dramatically and became codified.  
Postrevolutionary Era 
During the postrevolutionary period, the anti-Chinese movement surged along within 
the rise of nativist policies as part of the centralization effort. Besides the earlier economic 
crises such as the Great Depression in the late 1920s, the Eugenics movement from Europe 
and the United States and the new diplomatic relations with revolutionary China also 
contributed to greater central government involvement in the anti-Chinese movement. 
Eager to form a unified identity, the postrevolutionary Mexico championed 
indigenismo and mestizaje (racial mixture), claiming that Mexico was a land of the “Cosmic 
Race.” Although the idea of a cosmic race centered on the diversity of the racial stock of the 
unique Mexican people, the rejection of the alien element was prominent.161 Thus, anti-
Chinese ideology followed indigenismo and the celebratory mestizaje naturally and helped tie 
the northern states to the nation during the postrevolutionary era.162 
Mexican intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s chimed in with their ideas on the 
formation of identities and on what constitutes the Mexican racial stock. President Álvaro 
Obregón’s secretary of public education from 1921 to 1924, José Vasconcelos, the "cultural 
caudillo" of the Mexican Revolution who promoted the “decolonization” of Mexico, formed 
his philosophy about a "cosmic race" that affected all aspects of Mexico’s sociocultural, 
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political, and economic policies.163 In La Raza Cosmica (1925),Vasconcelos explored the 
consequences of racial mingling on the nation and on the world. He proposed that the 
Mexicans were a cosmic race, promoting the mixture of indigenous people with white 
Europeans but bluntly rejected the Chinese and black race in the mix. He argued: “If we 
reject the Chinese, it is because man, as he progresses, multiplies less, and feels the horror of 
numbers, for the same reason that he has begun to value quality.”164Vasconcelosalso 
suggestsed that the Chinese represented a backwards race and undesirable for race mixing.165 
The mestizaje ideology inspired more direct discrimination and condemnation of the 
Chinese as a race. José Ángel Espinoza, a public intellectual and leader of anti-Chinese 
movement, wrote the infamous anti-Chinese propaganda piece,El ejemplo de Sonora 
(Mexico: n.e., 1932), an effort to make the anti-Chinese rhetoric appear more “logical” and 
“sensible.”166 Adding on to Vasconcelo’s cosmic race theory, Jose Espinoza called for the 
eviction of the Chinese population. His rhetoric was embedded in racialized and gendered 
assumptions about not only the Chinese but also Mexican men and women. He argued that 
the expulsion of the Chinese had opened up space for young Mexican men for employment 
and added capital to the states.167 
In the meantime, many states in Mexico did face high unemployment rates of native 
Mexicans and general economic crisis. After World War I and again during the Great 
Depression, the United States repatriated Mexican workers, which demanded more job 
positions open in Mexico for the repatriates. The anti-Chinistas accused Chinese businesses 
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of competing unfairly, illegal lending practices, and excluding Mexican labor. They argued 
that jobs in Mexico should be reserved for Mexican workers.  
Thus, in face of the high unemployment rates, combined with racial ideology in the 
1920s, various states and the central government enacted discriminatory laws against the 
Chinese.168 In 1923, Congressman Alejandro Villaseñor proposed to the Sonora Senate to 
create “Chinatowns” and prohibit interracial marriages between Chinese men and Mexican 
women for prevention of various diseases such as “beriberi, trachoma, leprosy, small pox and 
Asiastic bubonic plague.”169 His proposals were passed in the Senate unanimously and were 
finally codified as Laws 27 and 31.170 
Nationally, Álvaro Obregón launched a successful revolt against the Carranza regime 
and subsequently became president in 1920. In 1921, Mexico issued its first ant-immigration 
law, which prohibited the immigration of foreign labor to Mexico. The law subverted the 
1909 immigration law that was friendly towards immigrants and revised the Tratado de 
Amistad Comercio y Navegación signed in 1899, which welcomed Chinese labor to Mexico 
and included a provision to protect China’s subjects overseas. The reversal of the Treaty of 
Amity with China was in part due to China being a weaker state after World War I, whereas 
Japan was a stronger state. As a result, Chinese immigration declined after 1921. Chinese 
immigrants made up 12.49% of all immigrants from 1911 to 1915, 6.69% from 1916 to 1920, 
but fell to only 2.61% of all entrants from 1921 to 1924.171 The drop in percentage of  
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Chinese immigrantswas a result ofChina’s even greater weakness after World War I, when 
Japan received control over former German colonial territory in China.172 
The anti-Chinese movement regained steam after Plutarco Elías Calles took office in 
1924. Racist organizations flourished across the nation. In 1925, an anti-China convention 
was held in Nogales, Sonora. Delegates from across the country attended and created the 
Liga Natcionalista Pro-Raza, an umbrella organization for anti-Chinese committees, 
throughout the nation.173 The Convention requested 30,000 pesos for its operation 
fromCalles’s government.174 Although whether they actually obtained the proposed funding 
was unknown, it was sufficient to demonstrate the close relations between the convention and 
Calles’s government.  
Plutarco Calles continued to strengthen his commitment to the Mexican working class 
and small merchants by also limiting middle-eastern immigrants and supporting the 1926 
federal legislation to further restrict immigration.175 Moreover, the Mexican Immigration 
Law of 1926 placed a six-month limit on visiting tourists, scientists, transients and foreign 
merchants. However, conscious of his international image and political reputation, Calles 
denouncedanti-Chinese organizations and vowed to protect Chinese immigrants in Mexico in 
the name of the 1917 constitution; this, however, was merely a façade.  
The anti-Chinese stipulations were further strengthened during the Maximato era 
(1928-1934), during which Calles became the de facto commander of Mexico. Calles’s anti- 
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immigration policies prevailed and were further reinforced during the Great Depression. As a 
result, anti-Chinese organizations prospered throughout the nation.  
Following a report by Andres Landa y Pina, director of Migration Service in 1930, 
which instilled fears of a “depraved, parasitic, and dysgenic ‘Chinese hydra,’” the Mexican 
government acted to exclude all Chinese immigrants.176 La Direccion de Salubridad Publica 
(Administration of Public Health) was retailored to a single branch. The legislators also 
revived Law 31 that prohibited Chinese men from marrying Mexican women in Sonora. In 
1931, the Sonora state stipulated that all Mexican business had to employ 80% Mexican 
workers and prohibited women from working in Chinese establishments.177 On November 
12, 1930, Dr. Antonio Quiroga, the Sonora state public health director, promulgated a law  
banning the Chinese practice of living in their business establishments and ordered 
allmerchandise that blocked the entrance of sunlight and air to be removed.178 
In addition to stricter regulations on their businesses, the Chinese in Mexico also 
faced expulsion. In 1931, 800 Chinese were expelled from Sonora. The state government also 
closed and confiscated nixtamal property of the Chinese in Hermosillo.179 The emigration of 
the Chinese from Chihuahua and Sinaloa followed suit.180 Of four-hundred-and-eighty 
Chinese businesses in early 1931, only one hundred and fifty in Sonora survived the 
expulsion. However, those which survived awakened a new anti-Chinese campaign. 
Nogales’s Chamber of Commerce sought native businessmen and capital from other states, 
leading to hundreds of Chinese merchants abandoning their stores. In March, 1932, Calles 
                                                        
176 Delgado, Making the Chinese Mexican, 182.  
177 Gonzalez, Chinos y antichinos, 134.  
178 Romero, Chinese in Mexico, 166.  
179 Nixtamal is a tortilla dough. Nixtamalization is a process to process maize and 
other grains.  
180 Gonzalez, Chinos y antichinos. 
 - 57 - 
began to enforce the new federal labor law that required 90% of all employees to be 
Mexican. Consequentially, 4,317 Chinese were expelled that year.181 About three quarters of 
Chinese immigrants left Mexico during the early 1930s.182 
Although the anti-Chinese campaigns finally lost steam after 1935, when both 
Plutarco Elías Calles and Rodolfo Elias were deposed, anti-Chinese activities and 
persecutions did not stop until the 1940s. Under Calles’s successor Larzaro Cardenas, many 
xenophobic campaigns continued to carry out such activities in the name of nationalism. 
Fascist groups, such as the Gold Shirts formed under Calles, carried out actions against 
foreigners. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, some of the anti-Chinese organizations turned their 
attentions to anti-Semitism in the 1930s. Comité Pro Raza del Distrito Federal (Pro Race 
Committee of the Federal District) continued to operate under the name of national defense 
and promoted programs to attack and boycott Chinese business.183 These programs did not 
lose their legitimacy until Mexico joined the allies during World War II.  
Conclusion 
The history of the Chinese in Mexico reflects the development and formation of the 
Mexican State and its interaction with the world. From within the Spanish Empire, the 
Chinese first came to Mexico as part of the Spanish colonization effort and the emergence of 
a global market. The influx of Chinese labor during the coolie era reflects the increasing 
globalization in the newly established Republic of Mexico, which was in dire need of labor to 
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develop its economy. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese Exclusion 
policies of the U.S. and the attractive progressive policies of the Porfiriato generated a flow 
of migration and created space for the Chinese to occupy the middle sector of small business 
in the society. However, the revolution upset the system through a surge of nativism; the 
increasing power of organized labor surfaced. This popular and regionally initiated 
resentment and persecution during the revolutionary era gave steam and provided agents for 
the revolutionary government to centralize power, forming the Mexican state. In the next 
chapter, focusing on the southern state of Chiapas, we will look further into the story of how 
the federal government used the anti-Chinese organizations to cement the newly established 
state and to institutionalize the revolution.  
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Chapter 3—The Anti-Chinese Movement in Chiapas 
 
 
On October 11, 1930, at 8:30pm, seventy-five Mexican citizens gathered at the 
number 5 house of the Avenue Madero and Pino Suarez in Tapachula, Chiapas, and formed 
the Chiapas branch of the Mexican Anti-Chinese League.184 The participants cited Article 9 
of the Mexican Constitution, which guaranteed the right to assemble peacefully. The same 
month, delegates of the Campaign Anti-China in Tapachula visited Leopoldo Alfaro, the 
mayor of Mapastepec in Tonalá, Chiapas, and asked him to form a committee (junta) against 
the Chinese in the city Mapastepec in Tonalá as well. Moreover, they arranged 
demonstrations in the city to agitate for attacks and threats towards the Chinese commerce.185 
What started this sudden organized effort to persecute and expel Chinese migrants 
and merchants? What brought the anti-Chinese movement to a state in which there was only 
a small number of Chinese residents? This chapter aims to answer these questions by looking 
into the history of Chiapas and its interaction with the federal government during the state 
formation period.  
The postrevolutionary period (1920-1940) was a crucial period for Mexico and the 
building of the thirty-one states. Some historians have looked at the anti-Chinese movement 
in northern Mexico as a function of the state apparatus and analyzed how regionalism of the 
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northern states had shaped the national politics. On the other hand, others concluded that the 
northern anti-Chinese movements were part of the resistance of the northern states against 
the increasing control of the federal government. It appeared that late in the 1920s, the 
federal government had appropriated the grassroots anti-Chinese movements that started in 
the north. The central state used that movement to consolidate power and then spread it 
across the country through nationalism. However, studies of the anti-Chinese movement 
outside of the northern states have been rare. This chapter examines the relationship between 
the anti-Chinese movements in Chiapas and the function of the Maximato. The treatment of 
the anti-Chinese group in Chiapas by the federal government reflected state-building efforts 
in postrevolutionary Mexico, particularly in the federal state’s concentration of the symbolic 
capital.  
Brief History of Chiapas 
Situated in the Southernmost part of Mexico, Chiapas has been geographically and 
historically isolated and distant from the center. To this day, Chiapas remains a remote region 
often beyond the direct control of the central government. The Zapatista Indian Rebellion in 
1994 that broke out in Chiapas highlighted long-existing problems between the region and 
the central government. The battle for power between the state of Chiapas and the federal 
government was an on-going process. From the local elite’s fight for control from the 
independence era to the postrevolutionary period, when the federal government finally 
institutionalized its regional clientelistic power, the negotiation of power relationships 
alwaysexisted between the center and the periphery. 
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Pre-Columbian era  
Before the conquest, Mayan Indians speaking many different languages resided in the 
central valley of Chiapas. An economy based on communal maíz cultivation had long defined 
Mesoamerican civilization. The inhabitants in the region strongly identified with the central 
Mayan culture in today’s Guatemala and the Yucatan Peninsula. No city state had achieved 
total dominance over the region. Instead, empires rose and fell: the early Nahuas at 
Teotihuacan, the Toltecs at Tula, and finally the Aztecs at Tenochtitlan.186 In Central 
Mexico, the calpullis, the basic and oldest unit of Nahua government of the Maya lands, were 
not subject to the payments of tribute to Tenochtitlan. The indigenous peoples of the Chiapas 
region maintained their autonomy even as the Aztec political-military influence advanced to 
the southern towns of Zinacantan and Sosconusco.187 
Spanish colonial period 
In 1522, Cortez sent tax-collectors to the region, followed by an armed unit to “pacify 
the local rebellion” after the local communities refused to pay tribute.188 The Spanish took 
control in the 1550s and established encomiendato control forced indigenous labor, and local 
Spanish landowners thus became entitled to unlimited laborers. Since the conquest of the 
province of Chiapas, regional elites had established clientelistic control over Indian land and 
labor. Local indigenous caciques still occupied their own sectors and cultivated a strongsense 
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of autonomy in the community.189 Meanwhile, the Spanish royal presence was minimal, the 
region being distant, unruly, and having few natural resources. As the Jesuits put it, the rustic 
frontier towns close to Guatemala were “no fit place” for proselytization.190 On the other 
hand, the abuse of indigenous labor provoked resistance. In Sosconosco, Chiapas, Indians 
were regularly worked to death on the cochineal plantation. The regional indigenous people 
maintained their autonomy through constant challenge of the Spanish rule.191 A strong sense 
of regionalism, “a striving for cultural, economic, and political autonomy,” prospered on this 
periphery of Mexico and Guatemala.192 
During the independence era 
Deep-rooted localism in Chiapas was apparent on the eve of the founding of the new 
republic.193 Chiapas’s elites broke into two groups: the pro-Mexico faction and the pro-
Guatemala faction. The pro-Mexico faction mainly consisted of elites from Ciudad Real (San 
Cristóbal) and the surrounding cities, while the pro-Guatemala faction opposed union with 
Mexico and represented the outlying areas of Tuxtla, Comitán, and Tapachula. Eventually, 
despite Guatemalan protests, the Provisional Government of Mexico proclaimed the union of 
Chiapas to Mexico with a plebiscite showing a vote in favor of the union among the Spanish-
speaking population. Meanwhile, the Soconusco region remained neutral until 1842, when 
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Oaxacans led by Santa Anna occupied and reincorporated the region into Mexico.194 Through 
these struggles for power during the independence period, the forces that opposed the 
Spanish and Mexico City’s centralization efforts became unfettered and thus created a de 
facto regionalization of authority.195 The advance of the province also met constant 
resistance. Popular revolts, such as frequent protests against government taxation in the early 
nineteenth century, rose along with resistance to political incorporation.196 Although colonial 
elites maintained dominance over the province and promoted their business interests, the 
relationship between the region and the center was fractured and unstable. 
Era of liberal reform 
As Santa Anna and the liberals came to power in Mexican politics, the Liberal-
Conservative division had its own twist in Chiapas. Divisions developed between the 
highland and lowland ruling families and centered around for whom and how long the 
Indians should work. Since the 1830s, two principal regional powers competed: the grandees 
of the Central Highlands and the farmers and ranchers of the Central Valley. The landowners 
of the Central Valley adopted Liberal ideologies, and the oligarchy from the Central 
Highlands became the Conservative.197 The factions in Chiapas sought control of more land 
and population in their respective regions. The lowland Liberal elites first won control over 
the land, much as the national political struggle played out.198 Conservatives did form a 
government during the French Intervention between 1861 and 1867, but Liberals took back 
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control quickly following the collapse of the Maximilian government. However, the struggle 
for supremacy by the factions of Chiapas defined their regional divisions.199 The process of 
political integration of Mexico, especially in Chiapas, began with reforms such as curtailing 
the Church powers and courting caciques. However, national government’s presence in 
Chiapas remained relatively weak and inefficient.200 
Porfiriato, 1876-1911 
During the Porfiriato, Díaz initiated a series of programs to bring Chiapas into the 
newly consolidated nation-state. He dispatched Emilio Rabasa to oversee the region between 
1890 and 1910. Rabasa implemented a series of efforts to modernize the region such as 
strengthening police force and expanding financial resources and administrative controls 
geographically.201 However, these efforts benefited mostly the landowners rather than the 
people.202 Progressive capitalist elites controlled the money and amassed political power in 
the region.203 The federal government in this period relied on patronage to bring the 
periphery under the influence of the center incrementally.204 
Revolution 
Before the Mexican Revolution, Mexico was fraught with regional particularism, and 
there was not a nation. In1914, federal troops marched into Chiapas and consolidated the 
victory of the liberal faction. The primary task of the revolutionary army was to incorporate 
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the provincial south into Constitutionalism.205 Loyal Carrancistas implemented a series of 
reforms to revolutionize the state, such as abolishing the system of indebted servitude, the 
most important labor practice in Chiapas.206 The imposing of the Constitutionalists’ rules 
soon propelled the rebellions of the Conservatives from San Cristobal. The Cristobalenses 
saw themselves as true revolutionaries against an entrenched oligarchy in Tuxla Gutiérrez. 
The opposing “revolutions” eventually culminated in a civil war in 1915.207 Despite 
infighting between regional factions, the government in Chiapas remained in the hands of 
non-Chiapaneco military officers between 1914 to 1920.208 The Mexican Revolution, adding 
to the long years of disorder and war, cracked the tight social control of local elites and 
opened the door for popular and federal participation in regional politics.  
Post-revolutionary period 
The 1920s were an era of transition. The revolution opened up opportunities for 
grassroots organization that sometimes posed challenges to the state power. The grassroots 
Catholic and moralist Right pulled strength from the lower strata of the society.209 The 
central state was in dire need of consolidating power and transitioning regional power into 
the institutions of the federal government. Peasants acted as warriors in various national and 
local uprisings and as backers of the local cauldillos.210 Hoping to survive the dangerous 
political climate of postrevolutionary Mexico, Álvaro Obregón granted states and regions 
more sovereignty to negotiate for the stability of the new state. In fact, not only did he realize 
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the necessity to accommodate regional powers, he made it the central theme of his 
government.  
During Calles’s rule and the later Maximato, the federal government continued to 
integrate Chiapas by forming an alliance with the state governor and influencing the 
leadership of the state government. The founder of la Unión de Partido Revolucionario, 
Raymundo Enríquez, became the state governor on December, 1, 1928. Enriquez 
consolidated his power in Chiapas by receiving backing from Calles and later the Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario (formed in 1929), and in turn, began institutionalizing labor unions, 
thus bringing Chiapas under the national political order.211 
Although Plutarco Calles boasted hisundoing of thecaudillorule, it was only during 
Lazaro Cardenas’s administration that the federal state finally grasped full institutional 
control of Chiapas. The federal government ousted the Governor Victorico Grajales and his 
camarilla, spread socialist education, and implemented agrarian reforms. However, 
Cardenismo did not last too long in Chiapas, as the state quickly followed the political, 
economic, and social development of Central America and sprouted guerrilla insurgencies.212 
Once again, the center lost its grip on Chiapas; the relationship between Chiapas and the 
central government was still wobbly.  
Summary 
 In sum, the political history of Chiapas shows that Chiapas has been long distant from 
the political centers and remains, even today, on the margins of the federal state. Since pre-
Columbian times, the region had been inhabited by indigenous groups far away from the 
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Mayan political center. Regional elites and caciques started to foster clientelism and 
caciquismo in the area during colonial times and carried on into theIndependence. Despite 
some land and political reform attempts to bring Chiapas closer to the center during the 
liberal reform and Porfiriato eras, like many regions throughout Mexico, Chiapas remained 
autonomous and independent of state control for the most part. Although the struggle to 
integrate Chiapas into the central government prevailed, Plutarco Calles tried to build PNR 
and manipulated elections to undermine regional authority by placing the governors directly 
under the party’s jurisdiction. In doing so, Calles achieved institutionalizing the clientelistic 
structure insidiously into the regional politics during the postrevolutionary period.  Real 
change, however, did not occur until more drastic education and social reforms took place 
under Cárdenas. Socially and culturally, the identity of a “Mexican” was fuzzy to many 
remote regions such as Chiapas. The anti-Chinese movement was thus part of the “cultural 
revolution” to Mexicanize the nation.  
The Anti-Chinese Movement and Postrevolutionary State Formation 
In order to convert the revolution into a permanent reality, authority could not be 
vested for too long in any one person. The revolution had to be stabilized. Creating a 
dominant, unifying party became a solution for forming allegiance with the regional elites as 
a means to rein in the provincial powers. Besides forming a party to perpetuate power, the 
federal government also promoted uniform education and immersive culture in order to 
disseminate the new revolutionary vision of Mexico into remote districts.  
 During those years of nation building, the federal government exploited the existing 
racial tensions and economic nationalism by appropriating the grassroots xenophobic 
organizations and movements. During Calles’s presidency, Chiapas was one of several states 
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to prohibit marriages between Chinese men and Mexican women and to confine chinos to 
certain neighborhoods. The Anti-Chinese organizations opened a branch in Chiapas to rally 
for attacks on the Chinese during the Maximato, although prior to that, there were requests 
from the Chinese for protection during the first wave of the anti-Chinese movements in the 
1910s.213 Discriminations and persecutions continued into the 1940s with boycotts and 
agitations for mass expulsions.214 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the anti-Chinese movement that originated in 
the north gained new steam during the Great Depression starting in 1929. As Mexican 
workers were expelled from jobs in the U.S., calls for job protection in Mexico by the anti-
Chinese organizations acquired greater authority and legitimacy. The national congress 
formed the Comité Director of the anti-Chinese campaign, making the anti-Chinese 
organization under the supervision of the Partido Nacional Revolutionario (PNR)215. The 
campaigns also spread widely across the nation. Nearly 200 anti-Chinese committees or 
nationalist leagues existed nationwide. They existed in the northern states of Sonora, Sinaloa, 
Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, Colima, Nayarit, Durango, and Nuevo Leon; Tamaulipas 
and Veracruz in the Gulf region; Chiapas and Oaxaca in the Southeast; and on a more 
reduced scale in Yucatan, México City, Michocan and Guadalajara.216 
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 With the cooperation of the Bloque Nacional Revolucionario (BNR)217 and local 
Chambers of Commerce, the Comité Director also organized a series of “nationalist 
campaigns” to pursue and stoke xenophobic fervor.218 However, the federal government was 
not completely overt in its involvement with the movement. The revolutionary government 
wanted to establish “populist credentials” by appearing protective of labor rights for the 
natives. On the other hand, the government was aware of its international reputation and 
wanted to let foreign interests know that the new government would protect their property 
and life as long as they obeyed the constitutional laws. This was particularly the case during 
Plutarco Calles’ rule.  
 While Calles was the state governor in Sonora (1915-1919), he turned a blind eye to 
the attacks and robbery of members of the Chinese community but granted protection for 
other foreigners under attack. However, he commended all mayors to order leaders of the 
anti-Chinese demonstrations to respect the rights of all foreigners.219 As a president and the 
jefe maximato, in 1927, Calles abrogated the Amity Treaty with the Chinese government, 
which had granted protection for the subjects of the Qing dynasty. In addition, Calles 
advanced local authority in Francisco Elías, who reinvigorated the movement and harnessed 
support from the newly established PNR in 1929.220 Nevertheless, Calles did not enforce the 
barrioization of the Chinese community and other laws regarding intermarriage. In some 
cases, he even granted protection for the Chinese residents during his presidency.  
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The relation between the federal government and the anti-Chinese leagues was 
ambivalent. In the times of economic and political crises, the federal government exploited 
and incorporated the state-initiated anti-centralist racial programs into the nationalist 
projects. However, the nationalist organizations were not always successful.  
The Chinese in Chiapas 
In the southern regions of Mexico, there were fewer Chinese, and therefore, fewer 
incidents of anti-Chinese violence. While there is no precise documentation regarding the 
date when the Chinese first arrived in Chiapas, most arrived in the late nineteenth century 
and the early 1900s due to their exclusion from the U.S. and hostility in the northern region 
of Mexico.According to the census, the Chinese population never exceeded 1% of the state or 
regional population in Chiapas. The Chinese population peaked in 1930, with a total of 1,095 
Chinese born in Chiapas; however, the children of mixed marriages were also counted as 
Chinese.221 
Some Chinese workers, along with Guatemalan workers came to work in cocoa 
plantations owned by the German and Spanish landowners in Soconusco, the coastal strip of 
Chiapas.222 There were colonias chinas (shops for coffee plantations) in Motozintla, and in 
Cintalapa y Jiquipilas, but not in Villa Comaltitlán.223As in other parts of the nation, Chinese 
businesses in Chiapas were looted and attacked frequently during the revolution.224 The state 
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of Chiapas also took measures to circumvent any laws or regulations that would allow for the 
arrivals of Asian populations, which were considered racially degenerate.225 
The Anti-Chinese Case in Chiapas 
On June 8th, 1929, El Herald, a self-proclaimed independent newspaper in Huixtla, 
Chiapas, published an article lambasting and demonizing Chinese immigrants, calling them 
the “degeneración de La Raza” and demanding that the government deport the Chinese. The 
newspaper boasted that its agenda was for the “advancement of the nation” (adelantos de 
pueblos) and claimed that it was independent of the government, although it did advocate the 
anti-alcohol prohibition project of President Calles on the front-page. Further, the editors 
claimed that they were founded with the intention of continuing the legacy of the Social 
Revolution.226 
The full-page anti-Chinese article “Fuera los Chinos de nuestras populaciones!!” (the 
Chinese of our population [should] leave) cited information from the United States. The 
newspaper enumerated reasons why the Chinese should leave. It first noted that anti-Chinese 
movements did not exist solely in Mexico. Other nations such as the U.S. denied the entrance 
of the Chinese to their nations; why should Mexico provide the Chinese respite and a 
comfortable living? It then demonized the Chinese by calling the off-spring of the Chinese 
and Mexicans “disgusting” creatures who “resembled worms.” The article further called for 
the expulsion of all Chinese residents and cried, “Why would our government permit the 
Chinese to cross our women?” Furthermore, the article condemned Chineros and Chineras, 
the Chinese sympathizers, calling their praise of Chinese workers false. Economically, the 
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newspaper accused the Chinese of taking their fortunes from Mexico and sending them back 
to China: 
We already see that those Chinese send the fortune that they robbed here from 
home. We see that they have flouted the labor law. We see that they have tricked 
ignorant women by giving them false promise, and abandoned them in the middle 
of the street with the bastards that they produced.227 
 
In addition, the article also used public health as an argument, declaring that the Chinese 
population was the direct cause of various contagions. Overall, the newspaper echoed the 
“yellow peril” themes often used for attacking Chinese immigrants in the northern states: fear 
of intermarriage, the economic threat, and concerns over hygiene.228 
Soon after the publication of the article, the Mexican Anti-Chinese League (LMA) 
was formed in Tapachula, Chiapas. They cited article 9 of the Mexican Constitution for 
support, which guaranteed the right of assembly.229 The same month, delegates of the group 
visited Leopaldo Alfaro, the mayor of Mapastepec in Tonala, Chiapas. Members of the LMA 
asked the mayor to form a committee (junta) against the Chinese in the cities of Mapastepec 
and Tonala. Moreover, they arranged demonstrations in the city for agitating attacks and 
threats against Chinese commerce.230 
On June 17, 1929, La Legación de China, a Chinese organization in Chiapas, 
protested the anti-Chinese propaganda published in El Herald to the governor and asked for 
protection. After receiving complaints from the Republic of China, the state government 
quickly reacted by removing the propaganda fliers and confiscating the newspaper. The 
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Governor of the State asked the mayor of the Mapastepec to provide protection for the 
Chinese merchants in the city.231 The state investigated the anti-Chinese organization and 
reported the case to the federal government. The correspondence between the state 
government and the Subsecretario de Relacciones (Subsecretariat of Foreign Affairs) 
revealed that the article “Fuera los Chinos de nuestras populaciones!!” published in El 
Herald was a reprint from an article in the biweekly “El Istmo” edited in Puerto Mexico del 
Estado del Veracruz and a reproduction of an essay edited by the La Liga Nacional Pro-Raza 
in Tampico, Tamaulipas. The investigations also discovered that the Liga Mexicana Anti-
China (LMA) in Chiapas was a spin-off of the Pro-Raza organization founded in Tamaulipas. 
As a response, the federal government communicated to the delegates of the LMA that the 
state government should have the authority to decide on the matter and asked the governor to 
act accordingly to the law. 
Further action of the LMA 
The newly formed Liga Mexicana Anti-China (LMA) did not stop its actions. On 
Nov.14, 1930, the president of the LMA in Chiapas and the president of the Comité Directive 
Nationalista de la Coasta Occidental (the Nationalist Committee of the Westcoast) wrote a 
letter to the Bloque Nacional Revolutionario (BNR), stating that the Chiapas government was 
biased in their actions protecting the Chinese merchants. They claimed that members of their 
group were assassinated by the local Chinese organization, and that it was not fair for the 
state of Chiapas to offer protection for the Chinese. In the letter, the LMA also cited laws that 
would support the action of the Congress and urged the federal government to step in and 
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take absolute control of the matter. It is important to note that the BNR responded that they 
would not support LMA’s claim against the state’s action.232 
The same months, two attempted assassinations of Chinese citizens occurred in 
Tapachula, Tuxtla Chico, and Pueblo Nuevo. Samuel Juan, the president of the Chiapas 
Chamber of Chinese Commerce, petitioned Secretaría de Gobernación México to increase 
security and protection for Constitutional rights of Chinese residents in Chiapas. The federal 
government confirmed these rights and agreed to provide protections to guarantee safety of 
the local Chinese community.233 
In addition, the local Masonic Gran Logia “Valle de Mexico” in Tonalá also wrote to 
the state government and volunteered to protect the local Chinese merchants.234 It was known 
that some Chinese merchants were involved in the local Masons in order to receive 
protections and support.235 However, looking into the history of Masons in Mexico, the 
Masons had become a tool for the central state to spread its ideologies, especially the anti-
clerical ideologies, to remote regions in the country after 1929.236 
Difference from the North  
In contrast with Chiapas, in the north, the federal government supported the anti-
Chinese actions of state governments. In 1930, Sonora passed its sanitary law to limit 
Chinese business and ban marriages between Chinese men and Mexican women. A year 
later, the Sonoran government reformed the Ley del Trabajo (the Labor Law), obligating 
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businesses to employ 80% native Mexicans in their establishments.237 In a response 
regarding the resolution of the Chinese problem in the state, Rodolfo Elías Calles, son of 
Plutarco Calles, governor of Sonora at the time, stated: 
It is convenient that our party actively participate in recommending that all 
committees initiate discussions so that, by means of persuasion, one is made to see 
that the needs of Sonoran people in this moment [require that one] must endorse a 
hard nationalistic campaign and take decisions to protect the already established 
Mexican commerce, since this will serve as stimulus for new national activities.238 
 
Rodolfo Calles went on to state that he would carry out all government instructions, and the 
state would comply energetically to defend the national interest as legal dispositions dictated. 
His statements revealed that the federal government and the Partido Nacional Revolucionario 
(PNR) were actively involved in the agitation of the nationalist campaigns to “resolve the 
Chinese problem” and used such campaigns as a “stimulus for new national activities.” The 
federal government and the PNR saw the benefit of engaging with the anti-Chinese campaign 
in order to foment nationalist sentiment. In comparison to the case in Sonora, the federal 
government’s response to similar events in Chiapas showed the reluctance of the PNR to 
openly deny the sovereignty of the state by blunt measures or decrees.239 
The central government took an ambivalent role in Chiapas’s anti-Chinese 
campaigns. Back in September of 1930, a Chinese was shot dead by one of the anti-Chinese 
organizations in Pueblo Nuevo, Chiapas.240 In January 21, 1931, the Pro-Raza Campaign 
Anti-China from Tampico, Tamaulipas wrote to Mexico City that the Chiapas state 
government was anti-patriotic, accusing the mayor of Tapachula of removing the signs of the 
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campaign’s event location which obstructed the operation of the anti-Chinese campaign in 
the city. The federal government sent the complaint by the Tamaulipas Pro Raza Campaign 
to the Chiapas government and the mayor of Tapachula, giving authority to the local 
government.241 The federal government also sent a note to the Pro Raza Campaign to inform 
them that the state governor of Chiapas had dealt with the matter. In addition, Por la Patria y 
Por la Raza Sub Comité Anti-China (For the Country and for the Race Sub Anti-Chinese 
Committee) wrote to the President about the matter and condemned the Chiapas governor’s 
sanction of the Liga Anti-China.242 
By February, 1931, anti-Chinese campaigns had become wide spread in Chiapas. 
Huixtla, Mapastepec, Tonalá, Arriaga, Tuzantan, and some other cities in Chiapas all had 
anti-Chinese organizations.243 In March of 1931, the anti-Chinese league in Tapachula was 
apparently also in business. A telegram to the federal government reported that a Chinese 
man erased the anti-Chinese propaganda disseminated by the Liga Anti-China on the 
sidewalk. The telegram asked the government to stop the obstruction of the work of the anti-
Chinese campaign.244 Many Chinese businesses were forced to stop operating; two other 
killings of the Chinese occurred during 1931, one in Villas Flores and the other in Santa 
Rosa.245 In addition, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce reported that the unlawful arrest of 
Chinese workers had also become common in the state.246 
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The anti-Chinese league in Chiapas continued to harass Chinese businesses and 
accused Chinese residents of injuring and murdering their members and destroying their 
properties. However, there was no evidence that any of the alleged murderers were arrested. 
The only arrests of the Chinese made were the gamblers and new immigrants who did not 
pay their registration fees. On the other hand, the Chinese Commerce and Agriculture 
Association continued to petition the state for protection. Notwithstanding numerous 
complaints and accusations and the demands for the expulsion of the Chinese made by the 
anti-Chinese groups, officially, the Chiapas state granted more protection to Chinese 
merchants because foreigners of all nationalities should receive equal protections from their 
adopted country as long as they worked honorably.247 The federal government also offered 
more protection for the same reason.248 
Meanwhile, the anti-Chinese committees retaliated by targeting Chinese commerce 
and organizations. For example, in 1932, the Chinese Commerce and Agricultural 
Association protested against a large anti-Chinese gathering in Tapachula and telegrammed 
the government for protection. In response, in August, Comité Por Raza asked the National 
Commerce Department to eliminate all the “National Chambers of Commerce” belonging to 
the Chinese businesses, because they were comprised mainly of foreigners.249 
The federal government seemed to have had internal disputes over its treatment of 
Chinese merchants as well. Srio de Interior defended the Comité and accused the Chinese 
Chambers of slandering and defaming their organization. Conversely, the Jefe de Trabajo 
(Chief of Labor) stated that, under the Ley Federal de Trabajo (the Federal Labor Law), the 
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government had to look after the Chinese business.250 On the whole, however, the federal 
government granted protection to Chinese. In June, 1934, the Chiapas state governor 
permitted the Chinese community’s request for protection as they reported that the anti-
Chinese demonstrators were hurling vulgar insults at the Chinese colony. The following day, 
the anti-Chinese organizers came with both the Sexto Moreno Presidente PNR and the 
President of Liga Anti-China. The municipal president (mayor) also tried to extort money 
from the Chinese businesses by threatening to hold another more hostile demonstration the 
next Sunday.251 The Chinese businesses protested, and the state government provided 
protection the next day.  
Other extralegal and more indirect harassment of the Chinese from the state 
government such as the arrests of gamblers and detention over registration fees continued to 
exist.252 Pressure to expel Chinese commerce and complaints about the Chinese from the 
anti-Chinese groups and other local communities carried on until the end of the 1930s and 
beyond. For instance, in 1940, Escuintla merchants appealed to the state government saying 
that the Chinese had unfair advantages in commerce and cited the newspaper, ChiapasNuevo, 
which claimed that the Chinese not only dominated businesses but also were damaging the 
Mexican race.253 By 1957, there were no more than 231 Chinese in Chiapas, with 120 in 
Tapalachua, 30 in Huixtla, 11 in Arriaga, 6 in Tonalá, etc.254 
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Rénique’s theory 
In “Race, Mestizaje and Nationalism: Sonora’s Anti-Chinese movement and State 
Formation in Post-revolutionary Mexico,” Gerardo Rénique proposed the theory that the 
trajectory of the racial movement in Mexico was a social and political movement to be 
incorporated within the new orthodoxy of the postrevolutionary state.255 He focused on the 
different treatments of the Chinese by the government during the postrevolutionary period. 
Rénique noticed that antichinismo was not only epistemologically compatible with the 
mestizaje and the imagining of a Mexican national biological identity,but it was also used as 
an ideological and cultural force to diminish the anti-centralist tradition in Sonora. The 
federal government was ambivalent in its relationship with the Chinese colony. The 
enforcement of the article 33, which granted the president absolute authority to expel any 
foreigners, was only applied to some groups. Rénique argued that the Sonoran anti-Chinese 
violence was the Sonorans’ way to denounce the central state authorities and their failure to 
respect Sonoran demands in the first wave of anti-Chinese movement led by Jose Arana. 
Notably, the anti-Chinistas gradually took office in the National Congress. The popular anti-
Chinismo from Sonora was eventually coopted by Calles into the PNR in the unstable 1920s. 
In the 1920s, the Calles government eventually coopted the anti-Chinismo sentiment 
originated in Sonora. Plutarco Calles incorporated the anti-Chinismo for the political and 
cultural repertoire of Callismo as a replacement for his virtually nonexistent social and 
agrarian policies and as part of the “cultural revolution” to “shape acceptable forms of social 
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behavior and activity and to establish new collective and individual identity.”256 Rénique 
maintained that the anti-Chinese movement fulfilled Calles’s new orthodoxy and played a 
crucial role in the formation of the PNR.  
Rénique demonstrated how such incorporation contributed to the creation of the 
“unstable equilibrium” during the Maximato. He contended that the unstable political 
situation and social conflicts of the 1920s prompted intense debates about the nature of 
Mexican national identity, and thus, created a fertile ideological and discursive framework 
for the expansion of anti-Chinismo from its mostly northern base onto the national stage. 
Furthermore, “Mexico’s post-revolutionary national identity was a product of the mutual 
articulation of regional, racial and gender identities, mediated by the political and cultural 
mobilization sponsored by the state and by the campaigns of the anti-Chinese movement.”257 
The incorporation of anti-Chinismo revealed the postrevolutionary Mexican state’s 
struggle to establish its hegemony. The demonization of the Chinese was part of the 
“ideological vehicle for the articulation of the economic and political crises of the 1930s.”258 
Therefore, the anti-Chinese movement and its political organizations were pivotal in shaping 
not only a “racial common sense” but also coexisted with the emergence of new state 
instruments of mass mobilization and control.   
Chiapas 
Rénique’s theory is useful in the analysis of the anti-Chinese case in Chiapas. The 
Chiapas documents show that the Liga Mexicana Antichina (LMA) in Chiapas was a branch 
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of the Pro-Raza sub-committee; it was not formed separately. As soon as the Chiapas state 
government agreed to provide the local Chinese with protection, the Tamaulipas and the 
Nationalist Committee quickly came to the rescue of the LMA in Chiapas. The close 
communications between the LMAs and the Bloque Nacional Revolucionario (BNR) also 
demonstrated that the LMAs became an apparatus of the BNR during the postrevolutionary 
period. 
Secondly, the propaganda materials disseminated by the LMAs were not only 
consistent with “yellow peril” and fear mongering tactics prevalent globally but were also 
clearly intended to build a sense of Mexicanness. The propaganda newspaper El Herald 
boasted of being a patriotic and youthful newspaper that carried on the “social revolution.”259 
The content echoed what was propagated in the northern states and throughout the country: 
the mestizaje, an official doctrine formulated after the Mexican Revolution. Such ideology 
further reified the Mexican race, to which the Chinese race stood opposite.  
Thirdly, the ambivalent stand of the BNR and the lack of action from the central 
government when anti-Chinese organizations urged condemnation of the Chiapas state 
showed the central government’s concern with the regional power. On the other hand, the 
direct insults and demonstrations against the Chinese carried out by the local mayor and PNR 
members in 1934 indicate that the PNR and its affiliated organizations had grown stronger or 
more pervasive in regional affairs. Again, the state governor and the federal government’s 
permission for protection displayed the negotiation and interplay between the central state, 
the state government, and the Chinese organizations.  
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Forms of capital 
Moreover, the anti-Chinese movements in Chiapas also shed light on particular 
mechanisms in the state-making process during the postrevolutionary period congruent with 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory on the genesis of state.  Pierre Bourdieu defines a state as “the 
culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical 
force or instruments of coercion (army, office), economic capital, cultural or informational 
capital, and symbolic capital.”260 Capital of physical force includes the instruments of 
coercion and the power to apply armed forces in inter-state and intra-state affairs. Economic 
and financial capital includes the power to tax and the right to coin money and define its 
values. Cultural and informational capital refers to the state’s unification and objectification 
of the cultural market. The state concentrates, treats, and redistributes information, “and most 
of all, effects a theoretical unification.”261 The State claims the responsibility for all 
operations of totalization including census taking and other informational control. In so 
doing, the state universally imposes and inculcates a dominant culture which constitutes 
legitimate national culture through teaching history and a uniform educational system and 
other programs.262 
Among the three forms of capitals, Bourdieu deemed the symbolic production in the 
grip of the state as the most powerful. Bourdieu also pointed out the focus on violence and 
physical force conducted by the state privileged coercion and thus the capital of physical 
force of the state. Bourdieu defines symbolic capital as “any property (any form of capital 
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whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents 
endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to 
give it value.”263 In other words, symbolic capital is the power to confer prestige and power 
onto subdivisions of the bureaucratic state and the ability to operate of codification of 
cognitive unification. He emphasized that the state possessed the “means of imposition and 
inculcation of the durable principles” of the structures conforming to the dominant one, and 
thus, symbolic power is supreme of all the powers or forms of capitals the state should 
concentrate.264 In particular, juridical capital is an objectified and codified form of the 
symbolic capital. It follows its own logic and is distinct from the concentration of military 
and financial capitals. The state creates the juridical field and acts in a manner of a bank of 
symbolic capital that guarantees all acts of authority. In short, it was the power to confer and 
recognize or disregard prestige and honor rather than honor itself that made the presence of 
the state felt. 
Case in Chiapas 
The case in Chiapas manifests the interplay and concentration of such forms of 
capital. First of all, the creation and the spread of the anti-Chinese organizations during the 
Maximato (1929-1934) was part of the concentration of symbolic capital by the state. If the 
anti-Chinese movement during the Mexican Revolution in the 1910s was a popular 
movement against the central stateresembling other parts of the revolution, the anti-Chinese 
movement in the 1920s was coopted by the state and used as an apparatus to spread a unified 
culture and political control. Along with the nationalista projects by the PNR, the anti-
Chinese movement was part of the project to unify and objectify the stock in the cultural 
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market. The anti-Chinese movement started in the northern state was initially a grassroots 
movement responding to the xenophile Porfiriato which rested on the coalition of foreign 
investments with the violent repression of social movements and popular resistance.265 By 
appropriating the anti-Chinese organizations and their agendas, the central state concentrated 
its cultural stock in the rise of nationalism and imposed an orthodox form of what a Mexican 
state should be. The spread and emergence of the anti-Chinese organizations reflected the 
state’s power to concentrate, treat, and redistribute information in order to effect a theoretical 
unification. 
Secondly, perhaps most telling from this particular set of documents, instead of 
asserting itself by coercion, the central state granted the state government sovereignty or 
authority to decide on the matter. The central government did not choose to use coercion or 
physical force when the state rejected the presence of the LMA and removed the signs of its 
headquarter to forbid its operations. The central state’s decision to grant protection to the 
Chinese exerts its symbolic power by conferring the state authority to act on the central 
government’s behalf. Meanwhile, the state simultaneously confirmed the legitimacy of the 
LMAs by asking the state government to cooperate with the LMAs and approved of the 
continuous operations of the LMA throughout the state of Chiapas. Locally, the state 
representatives of the PNR acted as the agents of the state and continued to harass Chinese 
business. In Bourdieu’s words, “all these facts invoke the logic of official nomination to 
institute socially guaranteed identities, as well as legitimate unions and groupings, by stating 
with authority what a being is in truth according to its socially legitimate definition, that is 
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what he or she is authorized to be,” and as a result, “the State wields a genuinely creative, 
quasi-divine, power.”266 
In a similar manner, the state granted protection to the organizations formed by the 
Chinese immigrants such as Legación China and the Cámara de Comercio y Agricultura 
China (Chinese Legation and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture). In so 
doing, the central government legitimized itself through the utilization of its capital of 
physical force, so that the central state should be the only power to apply force in intra and 
inter-state affairs. As FitzGerald and Cook-Martín observed, the anti-racism rhetoric of the 
state “was plainly cynical and motivated by efforts to consolidate state control over national 
populations, rather than by ideological norms of equality.”267 The ruling party built vertical 
pillars of support reaching down to various social sectors and imposed the will of the party 
from above.268 
In sum, Bourdieu’s theory makes sense of the ambivalent behaviors of the central 
state. The federal state’s actions and lack of coercion regarding the anti-Chinese activities in 
Chiapas did not merely reflect an equivocal stance from the Mexico D.F. or contradictions in 
its nation-building policies. In fact, the central government’s response to each actor in the 
drama of the anti-Chinese movement in Chiapas reinforced and legitimized the position of 
the federal government by exerting its symbolic power. 
Conclusion 
The period between 1920 and 1940 was one of transition and state formation for the 
postrevolutionary Mexican state. Historian Gerardo Rénique described it as a “cultural 
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revolution,” emphasizing the interaction among the region, popular resistance, and the central 
state. This chapter has provided further evidence for how the state incorporatedanti-Chinese 
organizations into its apparatuses. The anti-Chinese movement was part of the state’s attempt 
to consolidate power by institutionalizing revolution and a tool to agitate for nationalist 
feelings among the disparate populations of the emerging state. The very office of the anti-
Chinese committee was, in fact, in the same building as PNR!269 In the tumultuous years 
after 1929, despite economic crisis, political regime change, and the ascent of the Right in 
Mexico, the renewal of the anti-Chinese movement and its spread into the nation overall 
were a concerted effort by the state. 
The central government was also cautious with its negotiation of power with the 
peripheral regions. It allowed the state of Chiapas to act on its own terms. The treatment of 
the “Chinese problem” appeared to be a negotiation of power between the periphery and the 
center. The lack of particular success of the antichinismo in Chiapas, compared to the 
northern border region, was in part due to the weakness of the central state that was yet able 
to mediate regional problems. On the other hand, Chiapas, long on the periphery, was not 
brought to the center even after the Maximato. Moreover, taking into account Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theory on the genesis of the state, the equivocal behaviors of the central 
government over the anti-Chinese movement in Chiapas surfaces as the mechanisms of the 
state’s efforts in concentrating various forms of capital to unify the nation and impose its 
domination. 
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Chapter 4—Conclusion 
 
 
 Postrevolutionary Mexico witnessed a series of conflicts and reconciliations between 
the center and its peripheries. After the revolutionary chaos, the cohesive postrevolutionary 
state had yet to come into being. The Calles government, therefore, attempted a series of 
moves for conciliation and cooperation with the regional powers. Chiapas, a state on the 
Southern border, relied mostly on the rule of caciquismo (regional bossism).  Historically, 
this Southern border region vacillated between the equilibrium with the center and frayed 
relations of infrapolitical resistance that challenged the rule of weak Spanish and Porfiriato 
rule.  
Documents in the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) yield a micro look at how 
Chiapas was able to retain control of its peripheral powers through establishing and handling 
the group of “outsiders.” These materials reveal that the anti-Chinese movements in Chiapas 
provide a key example of how Chiapas was able to resist the central government’s policy that 
was being followed elsewhere in the country. The materials include complaints to the state 
and central government from the local Chinese organizations about the anti-Chinese actions; 
the correspondence between the anti-Chinese groups and PNR and BNR in the Congress; and 
the directives from the central government to the state government. Through the examination 
of these documents, we can see a picture of how race and identity interacted in the national 
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identity building campaign, and how, through identity politics, the center was able to exert 
control over the periphery.  
The focus of this thesis is on theorigins and the motives of the anti-Chinese 
organizations in Chiapas. The main question addressed here was whether the anti-Chinese 
groups were affiliated with the Mexican central government and to determine the extent of 
the relationship between the local anti-Chinismo movement and the postrevolutionary 
Mexican state. Researchers such as Rénique Gerardo have laid a good foundation by showing 
how the PNR incorporated the early anti-Chinese movements into the nation-building project 
and how it benefited the Sonoran-led government. The goal here has been to expand on his 
conclusion and further analyze how the PNR extended the anti-Chinese program to other 
regions of Mexico. Using archival materials that included communications between the 
federal government and the Chiapas state governor and the complaints from the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture and the Legation of China to the state and the federal 
governments, I have been able to extend Gerardo’s analysis beyond the Sonoran border 
regions. 
The evidence I found supports Gerardo Rénique’s analysis that the PNR coopted the 
regional anti-Chinese movement. These interactions reveal the larger picture of the interplay 
between State and its regional apparatus. The Liga Mexicana Anti-China (LMA) in Chiapas 
was one of the anti-Chinese organizations established in Tamaulipas and directly answered to 
the PNR. Rénique pointed out that the incorporation of the anti-Chinese movement by the 
central government during the Mexican revolutionary served as “an ideological and cultural 
force”270 and converged to combat the anti-centralist traditions that had historically shaped 
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Sonora’s regional cultural identity. In contrast to local roots of the northern anti-Chinese 
movement, the LMA in Chiapas was solely engineered by the central state. In other words, it 
was a top-down movement, instead of bottom-up.  
Further, the documents found in AGN reinforce several ideas engaged by previous 
studies on the Chinese in Mexico and the Mexican state formation. First, the incorporation 
and the expansion of LMAs confirms the surge of nationalism fostered by the revolutionary 
period. As Neil Harvey states, no identity exists in isolation from others.271 A national 
identity could not be constructed without against an “other.” The evidence buttresses the 
point that the anti-Chinese racism was inherently nationalist. The propaganda circulated in 
Chiapas suggested a Mexican race and was coherent with the prevalent narrative of 
“mestizaje.” The Sinophobic racism first stemmed from the early twentieth century 
eugenicist rants. Eugenicists such as Vasconcelos, carried the banner of mestizophilia and 
saw homogenization as fundamental to the health of the nation. Sinophobia was shot through 
with language drawn directly from degeneration theory and was manifested in Mexican 
nationalism’s exclusionary dictates in the 1920s and 1930s. By painting the Chinese as the 
degenerate “other,” it elevated the image of a “mestizo” race. The anti-Chinese ideology was 
inherently applicable on the national stage, because it supported the idea of a common, 
unified Mexican race.  
Secondly, the research is also consistent with post-revolutionary state building 
narratives. Chiapas was a remote state that was largely beyond central control for most of its 
history. Like the Sonora and the other northern states, the southern border state Chiapas was 
far away from the center and had long struggled with whatever power controlled Mexico 
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City. The disagreement between the regional and central government in the 1920s and 30s 
demonstrated the dissonance and negotiation of power. The intent of the anti-Chinese 
movement was undoubtedly a national unification project. However, although the state 
government disagreed with the LMA and removed their signs initially, the existence of the 
LMA was allowed due to the continuing pressure from the above.  
Thirdly, this research further demonstrates both the complexity and flexibility of 
Plutarco Calles’ policies. As mentioned in Chapter two, Calles, a native son of the Sonoran 
region, harbored mixed feelings towards the Chinese, as reflected in his policies directed at 
the Sonoran government. He saw the advantage of an anti-Chinese movement to increase his 
populist credentials; however, he granted protections to Chinese in Sonora based on 
“Porfirian era cientifico” rationality to encourage foreign investment for the economic 
development of his state. Once he was on the national stage and in a different economic 
environment (i.e., economic crises of the Great Depression), he demanded the scapegoating 
of the Chinese, again calling for the expulsion and persecutions of the Chinese in Sonora. 
However, he was unable to press for the same along the Southern border region. He 
concurred with the local administration and guaranteed protection of the Chinese businesses 
in Chiapas.   
Fourthly, the thesis demonstrated the transformation of personal rule (disappearance 
of the caudillo) to the newly established PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario). The PNR 
was formally founded in March, 1929. Its representatives in the Congress formed the BNR 
block. The anti-Chinese organization reported not only to the Secretary of the State in 
Mexico City, but also followed the instruction of the BNR block in the Congress. The PNR 
was the real engine behind the nationalist organizationby establishing the regional LMAs. 
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However, the state official PNR was later occupied and colonized by the local PNR 
organizations, which often decided affairs on its own and did not toe the party line, further 
demonstrating the weakness of the PNR. Although the LMA’s intended function was to bring 
nationalist projects to the regions, it did not receive support from the state administration 
immediately: the PNR backed down.  
Lastly, on a theoretic note, the specific case of Chiapas demonstrates how the State 
concentrated its political capital. The newly established revolutionary state was still weak 
and had yet to find resources to legitimize itself. The analysis helps to understand the 
ambivalent stand the state government took to establish itself. The postrevolutionary Mexico 
government was very much an embryo and needed to assert itself through symbolic 
interactions. The anti-Chinese movement on the one hand was a means for the State to 
capitalize on an existing grassroots cultural movement; on the other hand, the lack of 
coercive physical forces to impose the program on the state level provided only a symbolic 
assertion of the central state by granting variations on implementation to the regional 
authority, i.e., the state government. Collectively, the case in Chiapas projected and 
transformed various other capital into legitimate, “symbolic” capital. This is not meant to 
support the theory that the central state was a “predator,” or to downplay the increasing focus 
on the importance of culture in state building. The point here is to draw attention to the long 
process of state formation by looking at its necessary negotiations and interactions with the 
periphery. 
Recent studies on the Chinese in Mexico have looked at how Chinese immigration 
destabilized the nation-state--their trajectory diluted the borders of the nation state from the 
subaltern’s perspective. This thesis, on the other hand, chooses to focus on an area where the 
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Chinese population was small to make the case that the dissemination of the anti-Chinese 
movement may not necessarily have to have a “cultural” base. However, this case study here 
is very limited in that its sources were solely drawn from the government correspondence 
from AGN and focused on the state formation. Future studies of anti-Chinese movement and 
organizations in states such as Oaxaca and Veracruz, where Chinese were less congregated 
would enhance the argument in this study (and, fortunately, sources about the anti-Chinese 
movement in those states are available). 
In sum, the interaction and treatment of the Chinese, along with other minorities, was 
of great significance in the construction of nationalism in postrevolutionary Mexico. In the 
case of the anti-Chinese movement in Chiapas, the central government was more than an 
agent in the creation of the anti-Chinese organizations and their activities. Although less 
successful in demonizing the Chinese in Chiapas, the central government was consciously or 
unconsciously transforming what originated as a grassroots movement into the symbolic 
capital needed for state building through not only the dissemination of the organizations and 
propaganda, but also the useful interaction with the regional governments.  
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